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THE SENIOR MANAGEMENT MENS 
REA: ANOTHER STAB AT A WORKABLE 
INTEGRATION OF ORGANIZATIONAL 
CULPABILITY INTO CORPORATE 
CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
INTRODUCTION 
“It is a poor legal system indeed which is unable to differentiate 
between the law breaker and the innocent victim of circumstances so 
that it must punish both alike.”1 This observation summarizes the 
pervasive flaw with the present standards of vicarious liability used to 
impose criminal liability on organizations. As in civil lawsuits, 
corporate criminal liability at the federal level and in many states is 
imposed using a strict respondeat superior standard: corporations are 
criminally liable for the wrongdoing of their agents committed within 
the scope of their authority for the benefit of the corporation.2 The 
remaining jurisdictions follow some variation of the Model Penal 
Code standard, a narrower approach than the federal rule, finding 
corporate liability only where the board of directors or other high-
level managers “authorized, requested, commanded, performed or 
recklessly tolerated” the offense.3 
These liability standards, which rely on imputing mental states to 
individual agents, are fatally over- and underinclusive because they 
                                                                                                                 
1 Gerhard O.W. Mueller, Mens Rea and the Corporation, 19 U. PITT. L. REV. 21, 45 
(1957). 
2 See United States v. Basic Constr. Co., 711 F.2d 570, 573 (4th Cir. 1983) (citing cases 
that employ the strict respondeat superior standard); see also Christopher R. Green, Punishing 
Corporations: The Food Chain Schizophrenia in Punitive Damages and Criminal Law, 87 NEB. 
L. REV. 197, 200–02 (2008) (summarizing this standard, the “liberal” rule, and listing the 
jurisdictions applying it). 
3 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(c) (1962); see also Green, supra note 2, at 204–06 
(summarizing the MPC standard and listing the jurisdictions applying it). 
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fail, without justification, to differentiate between the 
nonblameworthy organizations and those which are genuinely 
culpable. Consider, for example, the following two circumstances:  
Corporation A employs purchasing agent X, a lower-echelon 
agent, who personally accepts bribes from a foreign manufacturer, F, 
in exchange for his promise to purchase F’s product. Assume a person 
is criminally liable for knowingly accepting bribes of this sort. A has 
extensive policies in place prohibiting such practices, and provides 
annual compliance training to all purchasing agents.  A also exhibits a 
track record of diligently supervising and controlling its agents to 
ensure compliance. There is no evidence that X’s superiors knew or 
had reason to know of X’s conduct. X simply took exceptional efforts 
to cover up his conduct and slipped through the cracks. Assuming that 
the prosecution can locate X and prove his knowledge, despite X’s 
apparently personal motivations and A’s lack of genuine culpability 
in the offense, A would be vicariously criminally liable.  
Compare Corporation B, a large, complex, highly decentralized 
organization employing purchasing agent Y. Y is given a lead to 
pursue a contract with Corporation F that has trickled down through 
the layers of management. After months of service on the contract, 
B’s accounting department accepts a check from F earmarked as a 
refund for returned F products, which were actually used by B.  
Essentially, the payment is nothing short of a bribe. Some 
indeterminate members of senior management at B had, a year earlier, 
made this arrangement with an equally unidentifiable group of 
management at F. Due to standard communications disposal and 
retention procedures and management’s deliberate care to obscure its 
conduct, there is no paper trail or credible testimony that may be used 
to trace the arrangement back to an agent at B. Assume that this is not 
an isolated incident, but that B has been convicted of similar 
violations in the past. Additionally, due to its lack of proper 
compliance programs and its notoriety for extreme bottom-line driven 
pressures on its purchasing agents, it appears to be simply indifferent 
to, or actually encourages such conduct. Nonetheless, since the 
prosecution cannot prove that any individual agent knowingly 
accepted the illegal payments, B will escape liability.  
This Note contends that the disconnect between organizational 
blameworthiness and liability under the current individualistic 
liability scheme warrants overhauling the standard for holding 
organizations criminally liable. That organizations demonstrate 
culpability independent of their individual agents has long been 
recognized both in other areas of the law and competing academic 
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conceptualizations of organizational criminal liability. Accordingly, 
this Note builds from the existing academic models of genuine 
organizational culpability and suggests a standard that uses an 
approximation of the senior management mens rea (SMMR).  This 
SMMR should be used as a proxy for the corporate mens rea by using 
both (1) subjective mental states of senior management and (2) 
reasonable inferences of senior management’s culpability derived 
from organizational variables commonly recognized as contributing 
to organizational culpability.  These variables should serve as 
nonsubjective circumstantial evidence of culpability. This model, 
which embodies the understanding of genuine organizational 
culpability and ensures true organizational blameworthiness, can be 
weaved seamlessly into the current criminal statutes in a form that 
courts can more consistently understand and apply than other 
academic proposals.  
Part I of this Note explains the development and shortcomings of 
the present standards of corporate criminal liability. Part II discusses 
the theoretical underpinnings of independent organizational action 
and intention in organizational theory. Part II also outlines the means 
by which the law and legal scholars have incorporated the 
understanding of genuine organizational culpability into models 
assessing independent organizational culpability. Finally, Part II 
explores the shortcomings of the prevailing academic models. 
Specifically, it focuses on William Laufer’s model of constructive 
corporate fault, one of the most substantively sound and practical 
academic models to date. Part III advocates a new liability standard, 
the SMMR, and specifically examines its implementation-based 
utility when compared to Laufer’s model. 
I. THE CURRENT LIABILITY SCHEME AND ITS SHORTCOMINGS 
A. Development of the Current Standards of Corporate Mens Rea 
An understanding of the present liability system requires an 
examination of the historical development of the law to bring to light 
the tension between the generally sound justifications for holding 
corporations criminally liable and the defective rationale behind the 
use of a respondeat superior model. Early courts struggled to 
manufacture a standard for imposing criminal liability on 
organizations from the predominantly individual-centered criminal 
law due to the prevailing view that the corporation was merely a legal 
fiction—a shell housing its individual members with no independent 
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identity.4 This view, exemplified by Chief Justice Marshall’s widely-
noted position in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward,5 is 
that a corporation is “an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and 
existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, 
it possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation 
confers upon it . . . .”6 Thus, American courts borrowed from English 
common law the view that a corporation is merely an aggregation of 
its individual members and may act only through these members in 
their individual capacities, a view entirely inconsistent with the 
imputation of criminal liability.7  
Throughout the nineteenth century, the “corporation as a fiction” 
view was progressively rejected as the corporation became more 
dominant in American society.8 Potentially damaging societal effects 
of giant, multidivisional organizations stood in stark contrast with the 
idea that a corporation was incapable of committing crime.9 In 
response, the corporation transformed from an untouchable entity to a 
legal person, and “the criminal law became the state’s response to all 
sorts of corporate wrongs, from the indictment of railroad companies . 
. . to elaborate prosecutions of conglomerate companies . . . .”10 
                                                                                                                 
4 WILLIAM S. LAUFER, CORPORATE BODIES AND GUILTY MINDS 11 (2006) (discussing 
the struggle of corporate criminal law to overcome the conception of personhood that was 
“bounded by a methodological individualism that limit[ed] the understanding of social and 
group phenomena”).  
5 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) § 518 (1819). 
6 Id. at 636; see also LAUFER, supra note 4, at 11 (“How then may a corporation be 
indicted? Corporations, being incorporeal, cannot appear at the bar for trial. The state does not 
charter corporations to commit crimes. To punish both the corporation and the members of the 
body corporate seemed nothing less than double punishment. It was simply inconceivable that 
corporations could act in ways that contravene the justification for their creation.”). 
7 See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 476 (“A corporation cannot commit 
treason, or felony, or other crime, in it’s [sic] corporate capacity; though it’s [sic] members may, 
in their distinct individual capacities.”) (footnotes omitted). 
8 See MARSHALL B. CLINARD & PETER C. YEAGER, CORPORATE CRIME 23 (2006) 
(noting that the Industrial Revolution triggered an expansion in the scale of enterprises, such 
that “[b]y the latter half of the nineteenth century the major firms in almost all industries were 
operating as corporations”); Mark M. Hager, Bodies Politic: The Progressive History of 
Organizational “Real Entity” Theory, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 575, 582–83 (1989) (“The fiction 
theory of corporate action was seen as a failed attempt by the law to deal with corporate facts 
without departing from individualistic premises.”). But see Albert W. Alschuler, Two Ways to 
Think About the Punishment of Corporations, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1359, 1367–69 (2009) 
(supporting many of the classic critiques of corporate criminal liability by arguing that a 
corporation is a mere fiction that cannot be punished, and that it is innocent shareholders who 
are forced to bear the direct burden of criminal sanctions). 
9 Laufer notes that “[w]idespread discrimination against people and localities, bribing of 
legislators, stock manipulation, and formation of pools were engaged in with near impunity,” 
and that the immensely powerful railroads “left many with the impression that corporations 
were more powerful than the very states that regulated them.” LAUFER, supra note 4, at 14. 
10 Id. at 12 (citing United States v. MacAndrews & Forbes Co., 149 F. 823 (S.D.N.Y. 
1906); United States v. Van Schaick, 134 F. 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1904); United States v. John Kelso 
Co., 86 F. 304 (N.D. Cal. 1898); United States v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 24 F. Cas. 972 
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Regulation of corporations grew steadily through the latter part of 
the nineteenth century with the growth of criminal liability and the 
emergence of regulatory law.11 Maintaining the trend, the Supreme 
Court extended corporate criminal law to all crimes, including those 
requiring proof of mens rea, in the seminal case of New York Central 
& Hudson River Railroad Company v. United States.12 In that case, 
an employee of the railroad company gave rebates to certain 
customers for shipments of sugar.13 The lower courts convicted both 
the employee and the corporation under a provision of the Elkins Act 
that imposed vicarious criminal liability on a corporation for the acts 
and intentions of its agents while acting within the scope of their 
employment.14  
Defense counsel urged that this provision was unconstitutional 
because “punish[ing] the corporation is in reality to punish the 
innocent stockholders . . . depriv[ing] them of their property without 
opportunity to be heard, consequently without due process of law” 
and because the provision “deprive[s] the corporation of the 
presumption of innocence . . . which is a part of due process . . . .”15 
In other words, the defense argued that imputation of criminal 
liability amounted to a punishment of the innocent corporation and its 
owners for the acts of a guilty agent. 
The Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that this 
provision was not unconstitutional. The Court emphasized the need to 
control corporations, which had quickly grown into enormously 
powerful actors16: 
We see no valid objection in law, and every reason in public 
policy, why the corporation which profits by the transaction, 
and can only act through its agents and officers, shall be held 
punishable by fine because of the knowledge and intent of its 
agents to whom it has entrusted authority to act . . . . [Further, 
giving corporations immunity] from all punishment because 
of the old and exploded doctrine that a corporation cannot 
                                                                                                                 
 
(W.D. Va. 1868)). 
11 See LAUFER, supra note 4, at 15 (noting that “[c]riminal liability, as well as the 
emergence of regulatory law . . . provided some needed relief from the risks associated with the 
rise of the modern corporation”). 
12 212 U.S. § 481 (1909). 
13 Id. § 489. 
14 Id. § 490–92. 
15 Id. § 492. 
16 Id. § 495 (“[The law] cannot shut its eyes to the fact that the great majority of business 
transactions in modern times are conducted through these bodies, and particularly that interstate 
commerce is almost entirely in their hands . . . .”). 
 1/5/2012 3:02:17 PM 
272 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:1 
commit a crime would virtually take away the only means of 
effectually controlling the subject-matter and correcting the 
abuses aimed at . . . . It would be a distinct step backward to 
hold that Congress cannot control [corporations] by holding 
them responsible for the intent and purposes of the agents to 
whom they have delegated the power to act in the premises.17 
Through this rationale, the Court articulated the enduring policy 
behind criminally punishing corporations: deterring agent misconduct 
by allocating risk of criminal liability to the corporation to incentivize 
greater control of its agents.18 As one commentator summarized soon 
after the New York Central decision, “[c]orporate criminal 
responsibility tends to prevent crime not only by influencing the 
corporation’s representatives of all degrees to abstain from 
conducting its business in unlawful ways, but also by influencing 
those of higher or more remote degrees to restrain subordinates.”19 
This deterrence justification is as legitimate today as it was a century 
ago, as “the power now wielded by corporations is both enormous 
and unprecedented in human history.”20 The criminal law thus serves 
as an important mechanism to deter the damaging effects of powerful 
corporate actors’ misconduct, which many commentators argue 
causes significantly more harm to individuals and society than the 
acts of individuals.21 
Federal law continues to embody the relatively unrestricted 
attribution of agents’ mental states to the organizations. The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stated the generally 
followed rule of organizational criminal liability under modern 
federal law in United States v. Basic Construction Company.22 In 
Basic, the court affirmed a conviction under the Sherman Antitrust 
                                                                                                                 
17 Id. § 495–96. 
18 See LAUFER, supra note 4, at 16 (“The ingenious public policy that emerged in New 
York Central & Hudson River Railroad shared the allocation of risks to both principal and 
agent. Corporate liability deters crime; it moves risk of loss away from risk-averse officers and 
directors and toward the firm; it efficiently distributes liability risk between the firm and 
employees.”). 
19 Henry W. Edgerton, Corporate Criminal Responsibility, 36 YALE L.J. 827, 835 (1927). 
20 Sara Sun Beale, A Response to the Critics of Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1481, 1483 (2009). 
21 See CLINARD & YEAGER, supra note 8, at 8 (stating that the costs of corporate crime 
“involve not only large financial losses but also injuries, deaths, and health hazards,” that they 
involve “incalculable costs of the damage done to the physical environment and the great social 
costs of the erosion of the moral base of society . . . ” and, finally, that they “destroy public 
confidence in business”); Beale, supra note 20, at 1482–84 (arguing that corporations are 
“enormously powerful actors whose conduct often causes significant harm both to individuals 
and to society as a whole,” and citing the wealth controlled by the corporations and the 
monetary losses that have resulted from large-scale corporate criminal conduct). 
22 711 F.2d 570 (4th Cir. 1983). 
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Act for bid-rigging in connection with state road paving contracts. At 
trial, the defendant argued that the bid-rigging activities were 
performed by low-level officials and without the knowledge or 
participation of higher management, and that the company had a strict 
policy against such practices.23 The court ruled that “a corporation 
may be held criminally responsible for antitrust violations committed 
by its employees if they were acting within the scope of their 
authority, or apparent authority, and for the benefit of the corporation, 
even if . . . such acts were against corporate policy or express 
instructions.”24 Although the “for the benefit of the corporation” 
requirement appears to provide a nexus between the interests and 
intentions of the employee and those of the organization, courts have, 
over time, effectively removed this requirement from the standard 
entirely.25  
In 1962, the American Law Institute (ALI) came forward with the 
Model Penal Code (MPC), providing a major alternative to strict 
vicarious liability. The ALI ultimately settled on three bases of 
liability for corporate defendants. First, corporations are liable for 
minor regulatory offenses where a clear “legislative purpose to 
impose liability” is present, and the agent’s actions were “[on] behalf 
of the corporation” and within the scope of his authority.26 This 
largely echoed the broad federal rule of vicarious liability except that 
it provides for a “due diligence” defense allowing a corporation to 
escape conviction if it can establish that a “high managerial agent 
having supervisory responsibility” used due diligence to prevent the 
offense.27 Second, a corporation is liable where the offense is based 
on a failure to discharge a specific duty imposed by law.28  
                                                                                                                 
23 Id. at 572. 
24 Id. at 573.  
25 See, e.g., United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 138 F.3d 961, 969–70 (D.C. 
Cir. 1998) (holding an agricultural cooperative liable where an employee authorized an 
expenditure from the cooperative in furtherance of a fraudulent scheme despite the fact that the 
employee hid the illegal scheme from others at the company because the employee may have 
been acting to further the interests of the cooperative); United States v. Automated Med. Lab., 
Inc., 770 F.2d 399, 406–07 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that an agent’s conduct, which is actually or 
potentially detrimental to the corporation, may be imputed to the corporation in a criminal case 
if motivated at least in part by intent to benefit the corporation); United States v. Hilton Hotels 
Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1004–07 (9th Cir. 1972) (holding hotel corporation liable where a 
purchasing agent  threatened a supplier with the loss of the hotel’s business unless the supplier 
did not contribute to a trade association, even though this was against explicit corporate policy, 
both the manager and assistant manager had specifically told the purchasing agent not to 
threaten suppliers, and the employee testified that he violated the instructions because of 
personal anger toward the supplier).  
26 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(a) (1962). 
27 Id. § 2.07(5). 
28 Id. § 2.07(1)(b). 
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The third basis, which applies to the majority of criminal offenses, 
provides that corporations are liable for penal law violations (with a 
few exceptions) where the “offense was authorized, requested, 
commanded, performed, or recklessly tolerated by the board of 
directors or by a high managerial agent acting [on] behalf of the 
corporation within the scope of his office or employment.”29 This 
standard confines the respondeat superior approach “to a narrow class 
of criminal acts–those concerning high managerial agents whose acts 
reflect the policy of the corporate body.”30 This refined standard 
strides toward a stronger nexus between the action and intention of 
the agent and the corporation.31 Charging the conduct of a “high 
managerial agent,” defined by the MPC as “having duties of such 
responsibility that his conduct may fairly be assumed to represent the 
policy of the corporation or association,”32 to the organization may 
have a greater deterrent effect because the organization can and 
should be required to exercise greater control over agents in elevated 
roles. And from a culpability standpoint, the actions of managerial 
agents more directly embody corporate policy, values, and intention. 
Thus, the acts of higher-level agents are better “reflective of the 
character of the corporate body.”33 
Despite its strides toward a better normative standard, the MPC 
model uses the same agent-to-organization intent attribution as the 
strict respondeat superior scheme. Consequently, it reflects many 
flaws of the broad federal standard, including improperly broad 
liability, the difficulties in locating a culpable agent, and greater 
inconsistency in administration and excessive prosecutorial 
discretion.34 Nonetheless, every jurisdiction in the United States 
currently follows the federal rule, the MPC standard, or some 
variation thereof.35 
                                                                                                                 
29 Id. § 2.07(1)(c). 
30 LAUFER, supra note 4, at 23. 
31 In fact, the MPC drafters acknowledged that this rule was a partial rejection of the 
federal rule in favor of a more reasonable standard for imposing liability on shareholders of the 
corporation. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 cmt. c (1962) (summarizing the rationale for 
confining the liability standard to situations bearing a connection to high managerial personnel).  
32 Id. § 2.07(4)(c). 
33 LAUFER, supra note 4, at 25. 
34 These flaws are discussed more thoroughly in Part II.B. 
35 Christopher Green observes that cases from fourteen jurisdictions (Federal law, 
California, the District of Columbia, Florida, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North 
Carolina, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin) follow 
the New York Central & Hudson federal rule for corporate crime, that statutes adopt the rule in 
Alaska, Indiana, Kansas, and Maine, and another eleven states (Alabama, Connecticut, 
Maryland, Mississippi, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Puerto Rico, South Carolina, the 
Virgin Islands, and Wyoming) allow corporate criminal liability without suggesting any “high 
managerial agent limitation.” Green, supra note 2, at 202. He notes that the remaining twenty 
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B. Flaws of the Current Scheme 
Establishing corporate criminal liability using vicarious liability 
was flawed from the start. The New York Central Court’s decision 
abounds with defective reasoning for its adoption. Despite the Court’s 
sound policy justification for imposing criminal liability on 
corporations, its use of strict respondeat superior attribution was 
misguided. This Part discusses those flaws in depth. 
1. The Flaws of Applying Respondeat Superior in Criminal Law 
At the most general level, the Court’s justification is flawed 
because it jumped into a respondeat superior regime without 
considering its fit with the precepts of criminal law.36 First, the 
“Court[] fail[ed] to appreciate the inherently different nature of civil 
and criminal law.”37 Tort suits function primarily to compensate a 
party for damage caused by another. Any resulting deterrence is often 
viewed as a byproduct of the desired compensation. But criminal suits 
are pursued “because of the impact a conviction will have on future 
conduct by the general public.”38 Additionally, because tort liability is 
commonly considered a cost of doing business, it does not carry the 
moral stigma that attaches to criminal convictions39 and is less likely 
to put the firm out of business.40 Consequently, respondeat superior 
                                                                                                                 
 
jurisdictions (including Guam) have adopted MPC-type restrictive rules. Id. at 205–06. 
36 See Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal 
Liability, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1095, 1114–21 (1991) (describing the developments leading to a 
corporate criminal law that has no intent requirement). 
37 Id. at 1115. 
38 Id. Another justification for the use of criminal sanctions is the retributive function, 
which focuses on punishing the actor for engaging in blameworthy conduct. See infra notes 77–
82 and accompanying text. 
39 See Bucy, supra note 36, at 1115–16 (comparing goals and effects of tort lawsuits and 
criminal actions); see also Preet Bharara, Corporations Cry Uncle and Their Employees Cry 
Foul: Rethinking Prosecutorial Pressure on Corporate Defendants, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 53, 
73 (2007) (“[C]orporate defendants, subject as they are to market pressures, may not be able to 
survive indictment, much less conviction and sentencing.”); Pamela H. Bucy, Organizational 
Sentencing Guidelines: The Cart Before the Horse, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 329, 352 (1993) (“In 
some instances adverse publicity alone can cause corporate devastation . . . ”). This stigma has 
actually been suggested as a form of punishment. Jennifer Moore, Corporate Culpability Under 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 743, 755–56 (1992) (noting that several 
commentators have “suggested the use of court-ordered adverse publicity as a criminal sanction 
against corporate offenders”). 
40 See Assaf Hamdani & Alon Klement, Corporate Crime and Deterrence, 61 STAN. L. 
REV. 271, 278 (2008) (“A conviction could have fatal consequences for business entities even 
when the criminal trial ends with a modest penalty . . . [because] a variety of laws and 
regulations can effectively put out of business firms convicted of a crime.”). For example, 
Arthur Andersen was given a modest criminal sanction but was prohibited from serving as an 
auditor for publicly traded companies as a convicted felon under SEC rules, pushing the firm 
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fits well into tort law, serving to compensate the victim by providing 
access to the corporation’s deep pockets, but is “anathema to the 
criminal law, which . . . should focus on personal intent,” and 
discouraging criminal intentions by corporate actors.41 
But, the most troubling flaw in the Court’s rationale is “its failure 
to consider the conceptual alternatives to broad respondeat superior as 
the standard for corporate criminal liability.”42 Pamela Bucy observes 
that the Court undertook an all-or-nothing analysis, choosing to either 
impose criminal liability via respondeat superior, or to forgo criminal 
liability entirely.43 The Court’s failure to explore alternatives is 
understandable given the limited scope of the issue before the Court 
and that the case was heard at a time when corporate criminal law was 
in its infancy and its merits were still a matter of serious debate.44 But 
the present ignorance of the substantive criminal law to the “subtleties 
of organizational behavior that courts are now better able to identify 
and appreciate”45 is not justified, either by pragmatic or normative 
concerns. Due to the progressive understanding of organizational 
behavior and culpability, prosecutors, judges, and juries are 
sufficiently equipped to identify and appreciate genuine 
organizational culpability.46 
2. The Failure of the Current Scheme to Deter Misconduct 
The respondeat superior standard also fails to deter corporate 
wrongdoing adequately. It is true that the deterrent function cited as a 
basis for vicarious liability may take hold in a perfect world and 
under optimal organizational conditions: 
Vicarious liability should align organizational incentives 
(e.g., increases in payroll compensation, significant bonuses, 
and promotion to higher positions in the corporation) with 
                                                                                                                 
 
out of business. Id. at 279. 
41 Bucy, supra note 36, at 1116.  
42 Id. at 1120. 
43 Id. 
44 See, e.g., Kathleen F. Brickey, Corporate Criminal Accountability: A Brief History and 
an Observation, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 393, 413 (1982) (noting that only certain classes of crimes 
could be committed by corporations); Edgerton, supra note 19, at 827 (“[I]t is not yet clear that 
corporations can commit all crimes; on the contrary, it is constantly assumed that they cannot; 
and it is not at all clear what human action is necessary to the commission of corporate crime.”). 
45 Bucy, supra note 36, at 1120. 
46 See infra Part II.A–C (discussing the understanding of independent organizational 
action, intention, and culpability in organizational theory, in legal doctrine and criminal 
practice, and as used in proposals for liability standards embracing genuine organizational 
culpability). 
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corporate policies, codes, standards, and procedures that 
maximize law abidance. Top management is put on notice 
that the failure to align such incentives with implicit 
messages to deviate from the law risks entity liability. 
Successful managers must institutionalize an adequate control 
system to identify deviance, exercise great care in the 
delegation of significant corporate responsibility, and clearly 
communicate the importance and relevance of policies, code 
provisions, standards, and procedures, while defining those 
acts that are within the scope of the agent’s authority.47 
As desirable as this objective appears on its face, in practice, 
respondeat-superior-based liability likely creates contrary control 
incentives due to its creation of constructive strict liability.48 This 
effect is best exemplified in cases where a rogue agent acts contrary 
to corporate policies and well-intentioned efforts to control the 
subordinate’s conduct. United States v. Hilton Hotels Corporation49 
provides an example. The purchasing agent at a Hilton hotel 
threatened a supplier with the loss of the hotel’s business if the 
supplier did not contribute to an association formed to attract 
conventions to the region housing the hotel.50 Although the hotel 
attempted to prevent this misconduct, the district court convicted it of 
a violation of the Sherman Act under the federal rule.51 The 
corporation’s president testified that the purchasing agent’s actions 
were contrary to the corporation’s policy, and two managers of the 
hotel testified that they specifically told the agent not to threaten 
suppliers.52 Even though the corporation took reasonable measures to 
control its agent’s misconduct, the corporation would still have been 
liable under the respondeat superior standard. From the perspective of 
a well-intentioned, diligent corporation, this is clearly an unfair 
standard. 
This unfairness not only creates another burden on corporations 
with which they must cope, but it also harms criminal enforcement as 
                                                                                                                 
47 LAUFER, supra note 4, at 16. 
48 Commentators frequently invoke the analogy between vicarious criminal liability for 
organizations and strict liability to describe the lack of incentives for corporations to internally 
control their agents’ conduct. See, e.g., Bucy, supra note 36, at 1114 (“If mens rea is essential to 
a fair and just criminal justice system, how did criminal liability of corporations develop without 
this element? . . . [C]ourts borrowed the respondeat superior principle from tort law and applied 
it to criminal law.”). 
49 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1972). 
50 Id. at 1002. 
51 Id. at 1004–06.  
52 Id. at 1004. 
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a whole because it “erodes the power of the criminal law.”53 H.L.A. 
Hart posits that a majority of citizens must comply with laws if they 
are to achieve their ultimate intended purpose of encouraging social 
stability.54 “Voluntary compliance will wane, however, if people view 
laws as unjust, unfair, or arbitrary.”55 Laws punishing a corporation 
despite its thorough efforts to prevent misconduct have this precise 
effect. Unsurprisingly, this creates an incentive for corporations to 
either forgo preventative efforts or to obscure misconduct.56 
Corporations may forgo preventative efforts, for example, by 
“hid[ing] the evidence, or [colluding] with the agent, to avoid their 
joint and several liability.”57 This incentive is equally present under 
the MPC standard, which encourages higher-level employees to avoid 
any connection with known misconduct by artificially insulating 
themselves from that knowledge.58  
It can be argued that the appeal of concealing misconduct is more 
theoretical than real because of the higher risk of prosecution and 
increased fines under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.59 One need 
                                                                                                                 
53 Bucy, supra note 36, at 1100.  
54 See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 116 (2d ed. 1994) (arguing that one of “two 
minimum conditions necessary and sufficient for the existence of a legal system” is that “its 
rules of recognition specifying the criteria of legal validity and its rules of change and 
adjudication must be effectively accepted as common public standards of official behaviour by 
its officials”). 
55 Bucy, supra note 36, at 1108. 
56 See LAUFER, supra note 4, at 16–17 (discussing the incentive to obscure and the 
awareness of the problem immediately after New York Central, as corporations explored the 
trade-off between compliance costs and criminal enforcement costs); Jennifer Arlen, The 
Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833, 836 
(1994): 
On the one hand, increased enforcement expenditures reduce the number of agents 
who commit crimes by increasing the probability of detection. . . . On the other hand, 
these expenditures also increase the probability that the government will detect those 
crimes that are committed, thereby increasing the corporation’s expected criminal 
liability for those crimes. . . . [This may incentivize] a corporation subject to 
vicarious liability [to] spend less on enforcement than it would absent vicarious 
liability. 
See also David A. Dana, The Perverse Incentives of Environmental Audit Immunity, 81 
IOWA L. REV. 969, 970 (1996) (“[C]ommentators stress that corporations may forego [sic] 
internal audits if they fear that they will be held liable for, and hence punished for, any 
violations that they might uncover.”). 
57 C.Y. Cyrus Chu & Yingyi Qian, Vicarious Liability Under a Negligence Rule, 15 INT’L 
REV. L. & ECON. 305, 306 (1995). 
58 See Bucy, supra note 36, at 1105 (“The MPC standard encourages higher echelon 
officials to insulate themselves from knowledge of corporate employee activity.”); see also infra 
note 244–45 and accompanying text (discussing the recognized tendency for senior management 
to, either deliberately or inadvertently, avoid positive knowledge of deviance within the lower 
ranks of the organization). 
59 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(e)–(g) (2010) (in assessing the 
culpability of and prescribing a fine to an organizational defendant, among other factors, the 
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only look to the infamous Enron accounting scandal,60 however, to 
see that this argument is naïve. Prior to the scandal, Enron 
“demonstrated a leading-edge commitment to corporate ethics and 
social responsibility.”61 In 2000, shortly before the scandal surfaced, 
Enron instituted a number of ethics and compliance measures, 
including a corporate responsibility task force staffed by upper 
management to analyze the company’s social and environmental 
record, and implemented a number of programs and policies to 
educate and encourage employee participation in a more responsible 
and ethical practice.62 “[Enron] did more than merely produce an 
ethics code and distribute it among employees. . . [and] devise ethics 
training programs, produce glossy ethics material, and give 
impressive multimedia presentations. It led many Fortune 500 
companies with a wide variety of social and environmental initiatives 
around the world.”63  
The Enron scandal demonstrates that corporations have the 
capability, as Laufer describes it, to play “compliance games” where 
the firm essentially puts on an artificial front of good corporate 
citizenship and compliance to ward off regulatory scrutiny and 
minimize the risk of liability.64 This phenomenon can be analogized 
to a moral hazard present in insurance: compliance programs, like 
insurance policies do not necessarily modify the poor moral character 
of the corporation (the insured), but may instead merely permit that 
corporation to engage in misconduct with less risk of investigation.65 
                                                                                                                 
 
court is advised to consider whether the organization obstructed justice; the degree to which it 
accepted responsibility, reported the misconduct, and cooperated with the investigation; and 
whether the organization had in place an effective compliance program at the time of the 
offense); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL 9–28.300: 
PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS (2008) [hereinafter 
PRINCIPLES], available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/28mcrm.htm#9-28.300 
(advising federal prosecutors to consider in prosecuting organizations, among other factors, the 
organization’s “timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its willingness to 
cooperate,” and the existence and adequacy of compliance programs). 
60 See Enron Scandal At-A-Glance, BBC NEWS (Aug. 22, 2002, 16:59 GMT), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/1780075.stm (summarizing the progression of the Enron 
accounting scandal). 
61 LAUFER, supra note 4, at 99. 
62 See id. (summarizing the corporate responsibility and ethics efforts launched by Enron 
shortly before the scandal). 
63 Id. at 100. 
64 Id. at 103 (describing the general compliance games employed by organizations). 
65 See id. at 122–24 (analogizing the moral hazard possible through the use of corporate 
compliance programs to that presented through the purchase of insurance contract). Regarding 
corporations’ tendency to create compliance programs as a form of insurance, see id. at 121 
(noting that “[w]ith some corporations—Enron and Andersen may be good examples—once 
compliance and governance expenditures are made, care levels may be expected to decrease if 
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And the increased odds of prosecution and the threat of a larger 
sentence apparently did not stop Enron’s accounting firm, Arthur 
Andersen, from shredding documents to conceal the accounting 
fraud.66  These instances illustrate that the deterrent function is far 
from optimal under a standard of strict vicarious criminal liability. 
3. Flaws of Applying Strict Liability to Corporate Misconduct 
Some commentators may argue that the constructive strict-liability 
treatment of corporate offenses is in line with the growth of strict 
liability and a potential shift away from the link between culpability 
and criminal punishment.67 However, strict liability is generally 
reserved for “public welfare offenses”: offenses of a regulatory nature 
which carry relatively light monetary fines, and for which proof of 
mens rea would be difficult to establish, or would impose so high a 
burden on the prosecution, as to prevent adequate enforcement due to 
their broad coverage.68 The United States Supreme Court has stated 
that the omission of mens rea from an offense is properly upheld 
where the statute “render[s] criminal a type of conduct that a 
reasonable person should know is subject to stringent public 
regulation and may seriously threaten the community’s health or 
safety.”69  
Based on this understanding of strict liability, the suggestion of 
such a broad-based shift to constructive strict liability for all penal 
offenses of corporations is unpersuasive. All corporate crimes simply 
do not fit the mold of traditional strict liability crimes such as 
environmental offenses.70 Further, under strict vicarious liability, 
liability may be imposed without any primary action by the 
                                                                                                                 
 
the consensus view emerges in the firm that those expenditures wholly protect against 
liability”). 
66 See Indictment at 7–8, United States v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, Cr. No. CRH–02–121 
(S.D. Tex. March 7, 2002), 2002 WL 33949318, for a description of the obstruction of justice 
charge,. 
67 See, e.g., Moore, supra note 39, at 747 (noting that “some commentators see the growth 
of strict liability as a repudiation of the traditional link between culpability and punishment”);  
see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: Reflections on the 
Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 213 (1991) 
(arguing that “a theory may be on the verge of judicial acceptance that effectively severs [the 
traditional] linkage between blameworthiness and criminal punishment”). 
68 See Francis B. Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 72–73 (1933) 
(discussing what crimes are punishable without mens rea). 
69 Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 433 (1985). 
70 See, e.g., C. Boyden Gray et al., “Attempted” Environmental Crimes: A Flawed 
Concept, 14 J.L. & POL. 363, 370 (1998) (“Although it is debatable whether environmental 
crimes that do not threaten human health should be considered ‘public welfare offenses,’ most 
environmental crimes are categorized as such.”). 
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corporation, as liability is based exclusively on the secondary actions 
of its agents. Given the “generally disfavored status”71 of strict 
liability statutes, that present corporate liability standards impose 
strict liability is unjustified. 
More troubling is that the strict liability effect respondeat superior 
standard causes a failure to inquire into the genuine culpability of the 
organization.72 Our system of criminal law has traditionally used the 
accused’s culpability to separate blameworthy from nonblameworthy 
conduct to focus prosecutorial efforts on conduct that is most harmful 
to society.73 This culpability analysis is required to promote the 
respect in the criminal law required for effective deterrence.74 But by 
using respondeat superior to assign criminal blame to corporations, 
the law arbitrarily punishes corporations without any true indication 
that the corporation itself was culpable for the misconduct.  
This problem is best illustrated where a corporate employee acts in 
a manner contrary to express corporate policy and for his own benefit 
out of personal motives. For example, in Hilton Hotels, the 
corporation was convicted for its purchasing agent’s threats to a 
supplier despite the fact that his actions contravened corporate policy, 
he was warned on two occasions against engaging in the misconduct, 
                                                                                                                 
71 See Liparota, 471 U.S. at 426 (noting that criminal offenses requiring no mens rea have 
a “generally disfavored status”) (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 438 
(1978)).  
72 See Bucy, supra note 36, at 1103 (“The critical weakness in both the traditional 
respondeat superior and MPC standards of liability is that they fail to sufficiently analyze 
corporate intent.”); Moore, supra note 39, at 761 (“Ultimately, the respondeat superior theory is 
overinclusive because it is a theory of imputed culpability. Under a theory of imputed 
culpability, what makes a corporation ‘culpable’ is not (primarily) any feature of the corporation 
as such, but the mere fact that an agent committed a crime.”). 
73 See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 114 (1968) (“All civilized penal 
systems make liability to punishment for . . . serious crime depend[] not merely on the fact that 
the person to be punished has done the outward act of the crime, but on his having done it in a 
certain state of . . . mind or will.”); Bucy, supra note 36, at 1106 (“The notion of mens rea thus 
developed as a way of distinguishing those who should be criminally liable from those who 
should not.”) (citing Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 989–90, 993, 1017 
(1932))); Bucy, supra note 36, at 1106–07 (“Today, the objectives of our modern criminal 
justice system focus less on ‘awarding adequate punishment for moral wrongdoing’ than on 
‘protecting social and public interests.’” (quoting Sayre, supra note 73, at 1017)). 
74 See HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 69 (1968): 
If it is not thought enough of a justification that the law be fair, the argument may 
seem appealing that a criminal law system cannot attract and retain the respect of its 
most important constituents—the habitually law-abiding—unless it is seen to be fair. 
And . . . [the] simplest . . . meaning [of fairness] is that no one should be subjected to 
punishment without having an opportunity to litigate the issue of his culpability. 
(emphasis in original). 
see also Moore, supra note 39, at 749 (“A system that routinely punished the non-culpable 
would create an intolerably high level of anxiety and apprehension, because citizens could no 
longer rely on their own, voluntary efforts to avoid confrontations with the criminal law.”). 
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and the agent admitted that he violated the instructions because of 
“anger and personal pique toward the individual representing the 
supplier.”75 Whether the corporation could reasonably have done 
anything to control the rogue agent’s conduct, aside from termination, 
is unclear, which argues against the organization’s culpability. The 
agent’s admission that his conduct was not undertaken with intent to 
benefit the corporation removes any indication that the organization 
influenced his decision in any way. Holding a corporation liable for 
this conduct is reflective of the trend, noted by one court, of cases “in 
which the corporation is criminally liable even though no benefit [to 
the corporation] has been received in fact.”76 Not only is this unfair to 
the corporation, but it may breed disrespect for the system, which 
further erodes the deterrence function. 
4. The Current Scheme’s Lack of Retributive Function 
The current respondeat superior scheme also fails to serve any real 
retributive function.  In criminal law, retributive punishment “appeals 
to notions of moral culpability or just deserts” by imposing criminal 
sanctions “because it is morally proper to punish that person.”77 A 
number of commentators push the retributive function aside in the 
context of entity criminal liability, arguing that the overriding 
deterrent purpose overshadows the need to consider retribution as a 
justification.78 But retribution certainly has a place. The lack of any 
retributive underpinning in the current standards of liability fails to 
reflect the criminal law’s expressive function, which provides that 
laws should “express the community’s condemnation of the 
wrongdoer’s conduct by emphasizing the standards for appropriate 
behavior . . . .”79 As demonstrated in the discussion above, principles 
of respondeat superior fail to inquire into the true culpability of 
organizations and, consequently, whether the organization itself did 
                                                                                                                 
75 United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 1972). 
76 Standard Oil Co. of Tex. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 128 (5th Cir. 1962). 
77 Developments in the Law – Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior through 
Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1227, 1232 (1979) [hereinafter Developments]. The 
retributive justification is traced to Immanuel Kant’s theory that criminal punishment must be 
invoked exclusively because the individual has violated the law, regardless of the deterrent 
consequences that may flow from the punishment. See IMMANUEL KANT, METAPHYSICAL 
ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 138 (John Ladd trans., 2d ed. 1999) (developing this theory). 
78 See, e.g., Developments, supra note 77, at 1235–37 (discussing the arguments against 
the inclusion of retribution as a consideration in entity criminal liability). 
79 Lawrence Friedman, In Defense of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 833, 843 (2000); see also Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal 
Liability, 81 IND. L.J. 473, 526 (2006) (stating that the respondeat superior doctrine should more 
fully exploit criminal law’s expressive capital by selecting cases based on entity 
blameworthiness). 
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something wrong and deserving of punishment.80 The appropriate 
limits on our criminal law invoked by retributive principles should 
not be disregarded in light of the predominant deterrent justification.81 
Although “[r]etribution has not been a traditional aim of corporate 
criminal law, . . . once the sense in which corporations are culpable 
has been more clearly identified, there is no reason why it should not 
become one.”82  
5. The Current Scheme’s Failure to Promote Consistent Enforcement 
of the Law 
Bucy points to another damaging function of the failure to assess 
genuine organizational culpability: its shortcomings in promoting 
consistent enforcement of the law.83 The effective strict-liability 
standards offer little guidance to prosecutors in determining which 
corporations to prosecute. The lack of prosecutorial resources requires 
the prosecutor to pick and choose which corporations to prosecute, at 
least in theory, based upon an assessment of the organization’s 
genuine culpability.84 For example, the Principles of Federal 
Prosecution of Business Organizations cautions prosecutors about 
using strict vicarious liability, suggesting prosecutors instead examine 
the pervasiveness of the wrongdoing in the firm, because “it may not 
be appropriate to impose liability upon a corporation, particularly one 
with a robust compliance program in place, under a strict respondeat 
superior theory for the single isolated act of a rogue employee.”85  
                                                                                                                 
80 See Buell, supra note 79, at 526 (“[R]espondeat superior is grossly overbroad since it 
has almost nothing to do with the social practice of institutional blame.”). 
81 See Developments, supra note 77, at 1241 (“[W]hile the primary aim of corporate 
criminal sanctions is deterrence, there may be some retributive limitations on the pursuit of this 
goal . . . .”). 
82 Moore, supra note 39, at 756; see also Developments, supra note 77, at 1231–42 (1979) 
(arguing that statues already indicate a preference for some retributive element in corporate 
crimes). One commentator, while recognizing that the current federal approach of strict 
vicarious liability imposes criminal liability where there is no corporate blameworthiness, notes 
that this failure to adequately consider moral blameworthiness “is endemic to the definition of 
crimes and defenses.” Beale, supra note 20, at 1488–89 (citing the flaws in assessing culpability 
through the restriction or elimination of intent in the insanity defense, in accomplice liability, 
and in many weapons and immigration offenses). But the fact that this problem is present in 
other areas of the criminal law does not justify the continued use of a flawed system, nor does it 
negate the desirability of reform. As the time-honored proverb goes, two wrongs do not make a 
right. 
83 Bucy, supra note 36, at 1108 (“Requiring proof of intent before imposing criminal 
liability also serves a second function: it enhances consistent enforcement of the law.”). 
84 See id. at 1108–09. (“Because resources are not available to prosecute every offending 
corporation that meets [the broad respondeat superior standards of liability], prosecutors must 
pick and choose which corporations to prosecute.”). 
85 PRINCIPLES, supra note 59, § 9–28.500. 
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While this looks great on paper, it would be naïve to think that all 
prosecutors decide when to act by assessing the true fairness of 
prosecuting a corporation in light of its independent culpability.86 
Among other improper reasons, the decision may instead be based on 
the ease with which a prosecutor may locate a culpable agent and 
obtain a conviction. Thus, the prosecutorial guidelines clearly “fail as 
an adequate substitute”87 for consideration of genuine organizational 
culpability in the substantive law. Giving the prosecution the nearly 
unfettered discretion to exercise their personal, variable views over 
whether to indict a corporation, without any required adherence to 
legal standards analyzing genuine corporate culpability, opens the 
door to arbitrariness. 
The current liability model essentially grants the prosecutor power 
to act as prosecutor, judge, and jury, which is inherently unfair to 
corporate defendants.88 One commentator effectively analogized this 
to shooting fish in a barrel: 
The simplicity of using vicarious liability to obtain a 
conviction bespeaks a certain unfairness; shooting fish in a 
barrel does not seem fair to the fish—nor to a business entity. 
. . . Unfairness to the fish results because, under the vicarious 
liability standard, accused firms cannot defend themselves on 
the basis of either conduct or culpability.89 
Prosecutors use this power to “negotiate deferred prosecution and 
nonprosecution agreements, essentially private settlements that 
impose large fines and burdensome supervision on corporations.”90 
Paving the way for abuse, prosecutors undertake these negotiations 
without the restraints of judicial oversight or grand jury indictments 
                                                                                                                 
86 LAUFER, supra note 4, at 24–25: 
Although most prosecutors consider the diligent efforts of corporations in deciding 
whether to investigate, charge, and pursue an aggressive prosecution, those who do 
not raise reasonable concerns. . . . For some state and federal prosecutors, no 
evidence of diligence on the part of a company can shield the principal from the acts 
of the wayward agent. Here liability is absolute; the miscreant agent simply acts and 
speaks for the principal in the commission of a crime. 
87 Id. at 63. 
88 See Gerard E. Lynch, The Role of Criminal Law in Policing Corporate Misconduct, 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1997, at 23, 59 (arguing that corporate defendants are 
“increasingly relegated to making their most significant moral and factual arguments to 
prosecutors, as a matter of ‘policy’ or ‘prosecutorial discretion,’ rather than making them to 
judges, as a matter of law, or to juries, as a matter of factual guilt or innocence”). 
89 Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Balance Among Corporate Criminal Liability, Private 
Civil Suits, and Regulatory Enforcement, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1459, 1460 (2009). 
90 Id.  
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and trials.91 And the agreements are reached “with no guarantee that 
the axe will drop if the prosecutor believes the corporation is not 
living up to the agreement.”92 This lack of prosecutorial discretion 
can lead to problems of overinclusiveness, as discussed in the next 
section. 
6. Overinclusiveness and Underinclusiveness in the Current Scheme 
When facing a criminal investigation, the corporation is stuck in a 
vulnerable position: either forfeit privileges, fully cooperate, and 
accept responsibility in the hopes of prosecutorial and sentencing 
leniency, or take its chances with an aggressive defense by refusing to 
trade favors.93 This vulnerability is underscored by the absence of a 
liability standard requiring genuine corporate culpability against 
which the organization can buttress a defense. Instead, if a 
corporation chooses to roll the dice and defend itself against a 
prosecution, it is left to hope that the prosecution will be unable to 
prove the culpability of an individual agent. This is particularly 
absurd because the agent may have acted contrary to the corporate 
policies and instructions, and his or her individual interests may clash 
with those of the corporation. As one commentator stresses, 
“prosecutorial self-restraint does not provide the inherent or legal 
protection against the problem of overinclusiveness that a genuine 
theory of corporate culpability would provide.”94  
The bulk of the criticisms to this point can be lumped into the 
general proposition that the present standards for establishing 
corporate criminal liability are overinclusive. Vicarious liability, 
however, is also underinclusive. This is because the vicarious-liability 
standard fails to impose liability where it may be due. This 
underinclusiveness surfaces in cases where blameworthy activity 
persisted but the prosecution is unable to locate an individual agent 
with the required mens rea.  
This problem is exemplified in a recent Massachusetts case, 
Commonwealth v. Life Care Centers of America, Inc.95 In that case, 
                                                                                                                 
91 Id.  
92 Dane C. Ball & Daniel E. Bolia, Ending a Decade of Federal Prosecutorial Abuse in 
the Corporate Criminal Charging Decision, 9 WYO. L. REV. 229, 251 (2009). 
93 See LAUFER, supra note 4, at 37 (“In fact, corporations have little choice but to trade 
favors with authorities with the threat of significant sentencing guidelines—prescribed fines.”); 
Ball & Bolia, supra note 92, at 246 (noting that the increased emphasis on corporate efforts to 
impede investigations in the prosecutorial guidelines has raised concern that corporations 
“would no longer be able to do anything other than raise a white flag—voluntarily self-report 
evidence and fully cooperate”). 
94 Moore, supra note 39, at 761. 
95 926 N.E.2d 206 (Mass. 2010). 
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the corporate operator of a nursing home was charged with 
involuntary manslaughter of a resident at its long-term care facility. A 
resident died from injuries sustained when she fell down the front 
stairs of the facility while attempting to leave in her wheelchair. Due 
to the known risk that the patient would attempt to leave the home, a 
physician ordered that she wear a bracelet that activates an alarm and 
locks the exterior doors if she approached an exit. However, an 
administrative employee misinterpreted the director of nursing’s 
instruction to “clean up” all resident treatment sheets and removed 
numerous physicians’ orders, including orders to wear the bracelets. 
The prosecution presented evidence that the omission from the 
treatment sheet was noted by the patient’s regular nurses and reported 
to a nursing supervisor.96 But on the night of the accident, a nurse 
from a substitute unit supervised the patient and did not check for the 
bracelet due to the omission of the bracelet order from the treatment 
report. The prosecution attempted to establish the culpability of the 
organization by pointing to the conduct of the various employees 
whose actions contributed to the accident, including:  
[T]he removal of the [bracelet] order from [the patient’s] 
chart; the knowledge of her regular nurses that she was 
supposed to wear the [bracelet]; the knowledge of various 
employees that [the patient] had a tendency to attempt to 
leave the nursing home; the knowledge of the nursing 
supervisor that the [bracelet] order had been removed from 
the chart together with her failure to have the treatment order 
re-entered; and the failure of the substitute nurse to check that 
[the patient] was wearing her [bracelet].97   
However, the court adhered to the traditional respondeat superior 
theory requiring the prosecution to establish the requisite mental state 
in at least one individual agent, and refused to aggregate the various 
employees’ acts under the collective knowledge doctrine to attain the 
level of culpability required for conviction.98 
Although Life Care Centers falls well short of demonstrating the 
most egregious misconduct, a set of circumstances with more 
aggravating factors can be envisioned—one in which criminal 
punishment is warranted on the basis of organizational culpability. 
What if the nursing home had a history of similar administrative 
                                                                                                                 
96 Id. at 209–10 n.6. 
97 Id. at 211. 
98 Id. at 211; see infra Part II.B.1 for a discussion of the collective knowledge doctrine 
employed by some courts to aggregate the mental states of multiple employees to reach the 
required mens rea. 
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errors, compromising the safety of the patients, but failed to 
implement adequate procedural requirements to control the errors? 
What if the individual to whom the chart reorganization was 
delegated had never performed that task and received inadequate 
instruction on doing so? What if higher-level nurse management 
throughout the corporation had tolerated lax charting and patient-need 
communication by the nurses? What if the board of directors ordered 
management to cut costs, which led to short staffing, a lack of 
preparation by and communication between nurses, and ultimately, to 
the patient’s death? These factors would clearly aggravate the 
organization’s culpability in the death, but would likely continue to 
leave the prosecution unable to single out an agent with the requisite 
mental state.  
The process through which corporate decisions are made and 
actions are taken within the complex organizational structure creates 
this dilemma in many circumstances. Marshall Clinard and Peter 
Yeager summarize this phenomenon as a product of the fact that 
“[o]rganizational machinery in a corporation may be set in motion, 
and each subgroup contributes a small impetus perhaps without any 
awareness of the illegal and potentially dangerous final result.”99 This 
problem transcends various organizational processes and industries.100 
The recent BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill presents a timely example 
of this inherent blame diffusion. During the Department of Justice 
investigation, former BP CEO Tony Hayward stated that the Gulf 
disaster “was the result of multiple equipment errors and human error 
involving many companies.”101 Although this is an instance of 
                                                                                                                 
99 CLINARD & YEAGER, supra note 8, at 45.  
100 Clinard and Yeager discuss the problem in the case of a drug company: “A drug 
corporation . . . has doubts about the safety of a new drug but does not pass on these doubts to 
the salesman. The salesman, in turn, assures a doctor that the drug is quite safe; the doctor 
prescribes the drug; and the patient dies . . . .” Id. at 45–46. Christopher Stone describes the 
issue in the context of an explosion at a nuclear power plant: 
We can readily imagine that there might be knowledge of physics, evidence of 
radiation leakage, information regarding temperature variations, data related to 
previous operation runs in this and other plants, which, if gathered in the mind of one 
single person, would make his continued operation of that plant, without a shutdown, 
wanton and reckless . . . . But let us suppose what is more likely to be the case in 
modern corporate America: . . . [t]he nuclear engineer can be charged with a bit of 
information, a, the architect knows b, the night watchman knows c, the research 
scientist task force knows d. Conceivably there will not be any single individual who 
has, in and of himself, such knowledge and intent as will support a charge against 
him individually. 
CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE 
BEHAVIOR 52 (Waveland Press, Inc., 1991) (emphasis in original). 
101 BP Report Spreads Blame Across Gulf Spill Actors, CNN U.S. (Sept. 8, 2010, 2:57 
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/09/08/us.gulf.oil.disaster/index.html?hpt=T1. 
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shifting blame outside the organization, it is also an example of the 
potential difficulties of locating an individually culpable actor within 
a corporation. The natural vertical and horizontal integration of 
smaller firms by large corporations does not modify the probability or 
severity of the misconduct, but the legal standard for holding 
corporations criminally liable fails to effectively account for the 
contours of organizational action. 
Armed with knowledge of this flaw, the corporate defense bar may 
exploit this gap in the law during trial to prevent a finding of liability 
despite overwhelming evidence of organizational misconduct. In  
Arthur Andersen’s obstruction of justice trial resulting from its 
document destruction in the wake of its accounting fraud in the Enron 
scandal, the defense focused the jury’s attention on a careful 
examination of individual employees’ subjective intentions to 
“corruptly persuade[].”102 Referring to the government’s failure to 
actually name those people before trial, the defense cleverly 
compared the prosecutor’s case to the children’s book, Where’s 
Waldo?, in which readers work to spot Waldo amongst massive 
crowds of similarly-drawn figures.103 Leveraging that theme, defense 
attorney Rusty Hardin frequently began his cross-examinations of 
government witnesses by asking, “Are you Waldo?”104 This comical 
tactic actually proved meaningful: during deliberations the jurors 
asked the court an unprecedented question: “If each of us believes 
that one Andersen agent acted knowingly and with corrupt intent, is it 
[necessary] for all of us to believe it was the same agent? Can one 
believe it was Agent A, another believe it was Agent B, and another 
believe it was Agent C?”105 As the defense hoped, the jury observed 
misconduct on behalf of a number of agents, but struggled to pin 
                                                                                                                 
102 REBECCA SMITH & JOHN R. EMSHWILLER, 24 DAYS: HOW TWO WALL STREET JOURNAL 
REPORTERS UNCOVERED THE LIES THAT DESTROYED FAITH IN CORPORATE AMERICA 357 
(2003). Andersen was indicted pursuant to Title 18 of the United States Code, which provides: 
(b) Whoever knowingly uses intimidation, threatens, or corruptly persuades another 
person, or attempts to do so, or engages in misleading conduct toward another 
person, with intent to . . .  
(2) cause or induce any person to . . . 
(B) alter, destroy, mutilate, or conceal an object with intent to 
impair the object’s integrity or availability for use in an 
official proceeding . . .  
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned . . . . 
18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(2)(B) (2006) (emphasis added); Indictment at 7–8, United States v. 
Arthur Andersen, LLP, Cr. No. CRH–02–121 (S.D. Tex. March 7, 2002), 2002 WL 33949318. 
103 SMITH & EMSHWILLER, supra note 102, at 357.  
104 Id. 
105 Jonathan Weil et al., Dramatic Question from Jury Could Shape Andersen’s Fate, 
WALL ST. J., June 14, 2002, at A1. 
 1/5/2012 3:02:17 PM 
2012] THE SENIOR MANAGEMENT MENS REA 289 
down the culpability of one agent as is generally required under the 
present liability standards. Although Andersen was ultimately 
convicted at trial, the conviction was reversed by the Supreme Court, 
which held that the jury instructions were misleading because they 
did not adequately convey the proper intent requirement of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1512(b).106 The ultimate disposition of this case aside, the 
substantive law simply should not permit the dilemma faced by the 
jurors in this case in light of the alternatives for assessing genuine 
organizational culpability. 
Despite the well-documented shortcomings of vicarious liability in 
the corporate criminal law, the present scheme remains rooted in the 
flawed rationale of the century-old precedent of New York Central. 
That rationale was not only flawed when written, but has been further 
undercut over the years with the emerging understanding of true 
organizational behavior and misconduct. The maintenance of these 
inadequate standards is no longer justified by the argument that there 
simply is no better formula for criminally punishing organizations.107 
In fact, a number of theories of liability have emerged that 
incorporate genuine organizational culpability and avoid many of the 
pitfalls of vicarious liability. With further refinement, these theories 
may be worked into a practical, consistent conceptualization of 
corporate criminal liability more effectively and more fairly serving 
the underlying purposes of corporate criminal liability. Thus, the 
survival of vicarious liability standards is simply not borne by 
necessity,108 but by inertia.  
II. MOLDING CORPORATE PERSONHOOD INTO GENUINE 
CULPABILITY 
A. Organizational Theory and Genuine Corporate Culpability  
The legal treatment of corporations has shifted from a flat refusal 
to recognize the corporation as anything but a legal fiction—
incapable of any action or intention other than that directly derived 
from individual agents—to a view of the corporation as a legal 
person—an entity existing independently of its individual 
                                                                                                                 
106 Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 706 (2005) (“[T]he jury 
instructions at issue simply failed to convey the requisite consciousness of wrongdoing.”). 
107 See William S. Laufer, Corporate Bodies and Guilty Minds, 43 EMORY L.J. 647, 654 
(1994) (“Absent a competing conceptualization of corporate liability and culpability, the only 
way in which to satisfy the requirements of the criminal law is to focus almost exclusively on a 
determination of the agent’s culpability.”). 
108 See id. (“Vicarious liability has survived as a matter of necessity . . . .”). 
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members.109 The recognition of corporate personhood has shaped a 
number of generally accepted corporate characteristics and 
capabilities: 
[A corporation] acquires a common will and has a continual 
life. It is more than merely the sum of its members. The 
independence of the entity from its members render[s] the 
exact membership of the entity immaterial: allow[s] for 
ownership of property and the assumption of debts; limited 
liability for owners; and permit[s] the delegation of 
responsibilities down the corporate ladder.110 
And, as needed by the tremendous growth of corporate 
prominence during the nineteenth century, the law acknowledged 
corporate personhood and brought the corporation within the sphere 
of regulatory and criminal law.111   
However, the effort to fit the corporation into the law through the 
fictional person approach was eventually criticized for its inherent 
flaw: it was an attempt to fit a square peg into a round hole. The law 
abruptly squeezed corporations into the existing criminal law without 
adequate consideration of the distinctions between organizational and 
individual behavior. The fictional person theory was “a failed attempt 
by the law to deal with corporate facts without departing from 
individualistic premises. Corporations were deemed merely ‘fictional’ 
entities because the law’s individualistic premises would allow only 
isolated natural persons to be viewed as real legal entities.”112 But the 
flaws inherent in the fictional person theory of the corporation live on 
in the limited recognition of corporate personhood in the criminal 
law. In the eyes of the substantive law, a corporation is a “person” 
only to the extent necessary to work it into a criminal statute and 
attribute to it the blame of an individual agent. This unjustifiably rigid 
view of personhood fails to incorporate the dynamics of true 
organizational action and culpability.  
                                                                                                                 
109 Sanford A Schane, The Corporation Is a Person: The Language of a Legal Fiction, 61 
TUL. L. REV. 563, 568 (1987) (“The person theory . . . conceived of the corporation as a real 
entity that existed independently of its members.”). 
110 LAUFER, supra note 4, at 50. 
111 Id. at 47 (arguing that the in order “[t]o indict, prosecute, and convict . . . corporations 
and partnerships” that the law “grant[s] [them] the status of a legal person separate and apart 
from their many employees and employers scattered in regional headquarters and field offices 
around the world”).  
112 Mark M. Hager, Bodies Politic: The Progressive History of Organizational “Real 
Entity” Theory, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 575, 583 (1989). 
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Simply stated, “the rhetoric of corporate personhood has been far 
less profound than convenient.”113 The constraints imposed by the 
continued adherence to principles of individual culpability have 
confined the substantive corporate criminal law to a scheme that is 
unfair, at times ineffective, and inconsistent with widely-accepted 
standards of organizational behavior: 
Legislators and courts that seem to struggle with extending 
the idea of personhood to matters of liability and blame 
nevertheless watch as it is incorporated without reflection in 
both prosecutorial and sentencing guidelines. This dichotomy 
makes the substantive criminal law look both strange and 
weak: strange because prosecutors and judges sidestep the 
substantive law, still grounded in principles of vicarious 
liability, in favor of ad hoc standards of corporate citizenship, 
corporate due diligence, and good corporate governance—
much of it cast in terms of postoffense behavior; weak 
because the substantive law, in the context of sentencing law, 
is seemingly unable to conceive of an organization in 
organizational terms.114 
Given the flaws of the current scheme, the law’s failure to parlay 
the organizational independence embodied in the personhood 
metaphor into principles of independent corporate action and 
intention is puzzling.115 This recognition is the first logical step 
toward understanding the relationship between individual and 
organizational action and intention, and in turn, how this relationship 
influences genuine organizational culpability. Corporate behavior 
cannot be fully understood within the bounds of an analogy to 
individual criminality. In order to develop an effective system for 
identifying genuine corporate conduct and culpability, it is necessary 
to “drop the analogy of the corporation as a person and analyze the 
behavior of the corporation in terms of what it really is: a complex 
organization.”116 
The present liability standards fail to consider the range of 
variables critical to understanding the manner in which an 
organization acts, behaves, and exhibits culpability for criminal 
                                                                                                                 
113 LAUFER, supra note 4, at 48. 
114 Id.  
115 Laufer notes that “[t]here is a wide range of reactions to the ascription of human 
characteristics to corporate entities, from a vocal minority who attribute the evils of 
globalization to corporate personhood to a majority who do not know what to make of it; reject 
it as anthropomorphic, irrelevant; think it inefficient; or are simply ambivalent.” Id. at 47. 
116 CLINARD & YEAGER, supra note 8, at 43. 
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activity independent of its agents. Organizational theory provides 
insight into how the structure and operation of a complex 
organization may be translated into illegal corporate behavior.117 
Factors such as the size of the organization, the diffusion of 
responsibility, the hierarchical structure, and corporate goals and 
policies may shed light on how a climate conducive to criminal 
misconduct, or one which even encourages illegal behavior by 
corporate agents, may be produced.118 After rejecting the currently-
inadequate understanding of corporate personhood in the law, the 
next necessary step toward the development of superior standards of 
corporate criminal liability demands an understanding of the factors 
that contribute to genuine organizational culpability.  
Bucy’s discussion of a “corporate ethos” as a proxy for assigning 
fault soundly exemplifies the distinct natures of individual and 
organizational action and intention.119 Bucy’s ethos theory assumes 
that each corporation has a distinctive “‘characteristic spirit’ 
[reflected by] . . . [s]uperficial things such as the manner of dress and 
the camaraderie of the employees as well as formal, written goals and 
policies.”120 Emphasizing corporate independence, Bucy argues that 
that this “‘characteristic spirit’ . . . may transcend individuals and 
even generations.”121 Supporting this view, Christopher Stone 
observes that “[i]n [the corporate] setting each man’s own wants, 
ideas—even his perceptions and emotions—are swayed and directed 
by an institutional structure so pervasive that it might be construed as 
having a set of goals and constraints (if not mind and purpose) of its 
own.”122 The distinctive cultures reflected from organization to 
organization have been readily observed by organizational 
theorists.123 In addition to establishing the organization’s reputation 
                                                                                                                 
117 See id. (“[O]rganizational theory can provide some insights into how the corporations’ 
unique nature as large-scale organizations relates to their illegal behavior.”). 
118 Id.; see also Moore, supra note 39, at 753: 
Although corporations always act through individual agents, and it is always an 
individual agent or group of agents who breaks the law, it is fair to say that 
corporations frequently cause their agents to violate the law. The behavior of 
individuals in corporations is not merely the product of individual choice; it is 
stimulated and shaped by goals, rules, policies, and procedures that are features of 
the corporation as an entity. 
119 Bucy, supra note 36, at 1121. 
120 Id. at 1123. 
121 Id.  
122 STONE, supra note 100, at 7 (emphasis in original). 
123 See WALLY OLINS, THE CORPORATE PERSONALITY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE OF 
CORPORATE IDENTITY 82 (1978) (“It is not true that all big companies are the same—they 
aren’t. . . . [O]rganisations manage to develop an ethos, . . . a personality which is so ingrained, 
so much a part of them, that the corporate identity expresses itself in their every action.”); Bucy, 
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and an understanding of its values and operational policies, the 
culture bears on the tendencies of corporate agents to engage in 
unethical or illegal conduct. For example, Clinard and Yeager found 
in an examination of the largest U.S. manufacturing firms that some 
firms were charged with a number of violations for illegal political 
contributions or foreign payments, indicating a culture conducive to 
or encouraging unethical behavior.124  
Scholars have recognized a number of characteristics that can 
support criminal behavior by corporate agents and, as a result, 
demonstrate a connection between agent misconduct and corporate 
culpability sufficient to impose criminal blame on the corporation. 
Admittedly, it is intimidating, at first glance, to weigh the expanse of 
organizational characteristics that may contribute to corporate action 
and intention in order to make a culpability determination. These 
characteristics, however, may be manageably distilled and organized 
into aggravating and mitigating factors and analyzed as pieces of 
circumstantial evidence to reach an estimation of organizational 
culpability.  
Bucy’s summary of evidence contributing to a “corporate ethos” 
that encourages misconduct sketches many of the key factors that 
contribute to organizational culpability. First is the corporate 
hierarchy, which involves an examination of the roles of the board of 
directors and high management, and how the individuals filling these 
positions, coupled with the structure of authority, contribute to the 
control of misconduct, or on the other hand, how they encourage 
misconduct.125 Next, Bucy recommends examination of corporate 
goals to determine “whether the goals set by the corporation . . . 
promote lawful behavior or are so unrealistic that they encourage 
illegal behavior.”126 This inquiry targets latent culpable corporate 
action resulting from an organization’s setting virtually unattainable 
goals and turning a blind eye to the means by which the goals are 
met.127 Next, she suggests an inquiry into the corporation’s 
compliance efforts. A corporation’s efforts to educate employees 
about the legal requirements that correspond to their responsibilities 
                                                                                                                 
 
supra note 36, at 1123–26 (summarizing organizational research focusing on the variation 
between organizational cultures). 
124 CLINARD & YEAGER, supra note 8, at 58 (finding that “some corporations have been 
charged with numerous violations of various types”). 
125 See Bucy, supra note 36, at 1129–33 (discussing the relationship between corporate 
hierarchy and criminal conduct). 
126 Id. at 1133. 
127 See id. (noting that economic pressures within a corporation may tempt employees to 
engage in risky behavior for personal gain). 
 1/5/2012 3:02:17 PM 
294 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:1 
play into the ethos inquiry, specifically employees in autonomous 
positions because those positions provide ample opportunity for 
deviance.128 Similarly, the corporation’s efforts to monitor and 
enforce employee compliance with the law are relevant to determine 
the corporation’s prevention of, or indifference to, criminal conduct 
by employees.129 Bucy also advocates an examination of the 
corporation’s efforts to investigate the offense, focusing specifically 
on the degree to which higher echelon officials contributed to or 
“recklessly tolerated” the misconduct.130 Finally, Bucy argues that 
courts should examine the degree to which the compensation scheme 
and indemnification policies award or condone unlawful behavior.131 
This understanding of independent organizational personality 
clearly lays the groundwork for the incorporation of genuine 
organizational culpability into more substantively sound criminal 
liability standards. But with the federal law and all states following 
some variation of the two traditional liability standards, the law is still 
in need of a stronger model. While most of the work toward a better 
standard has, to this point, come from scholars, both law and 
academia have awkwardly struggled to develop both a substantively 
and practically adequate model making use of genuine organizational 
culpability. 
B. The Law’s Attempts to Incorporate Genuine Culpability 
1. The Collective Knowledge Doctrine 
Although the present organizational liability standards continue to 
adhere to some variation of the respondeat superior or MPC 
approaches, the law has made efforts to recognize independent 
organizational personality and culpability. One instance appears in the 
judicial doctrine of collective knowledge. This doctrine serves as a 
patch for the underinclusiveness produced by the current standards in 
circumstances where no individually culpable agent is located but the 
organization appears justly to blame for the offense.132 To do so, “[i]t 
permits a finding of corporate mens rea to be derived from the 
collective knowledge of the corporation’s members.”133  
                                                                                                                 
128 Id. at 1134–35. 
129 Id. at 1136–38. 
130 Id. at 1138. 
131 Id. at 1139–46. 
132 See Moore, supra note 39, at 763 (“[Collective knowledge] enables courts to find 
liability in cases in which the corporation seems ‘justly to blame’ for the crime, but no single 
individual has the required mens rea.”). 
133 Id. 
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The seminal case invoking the collective knowledge doctrine is 
United States v. Bank of New England.134 In this case, a bank was 
charged with and convicted of willfully violating the Currency 
Transaction Reporting Act for its failure to report cash deposits in 
excess of $10,000, but argued that no single agent exhibited the 
required willfulness.135 A customer made two to four cash deposits in 
multiple transactions, each deposit under $10,000, but with each 
transaction aggregating to more than $10,000.136 The teller dealing 
with the customer engaging in the transaction at issue may have been 
unaware of the Act.137 The teller’s supervisor was aware of the Act 
but did not instruct the teller to record the transaction. The bank’s 
project coordinator, working in the bank’s main office, knew of the 
aggregation requirement, but had no knowledge that the transaction 
had occurred.138 The United States Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit upheld an instruction to the jury permitting it to aggregate 
these pieces of knowledge to reach the required willfulness, reasoning 
that: 
A collective knowledge instruction is entirely appropriate in 
the context of corporate criminal liability. . . . Corporations 
compartmentalize knowledge, subdividing the elements of 
specific duties and operations into smaller components. The 
aggregate of these components constitutes the corporation's 
knowledge of a particular operation. It is irrelevant whether 
employees administering one component of an operation 
know the specific activities of employees administering 
another aspect of the operation . . . .139 
The court’s justification articulates the progressive recognition of 
the collective knowledge doctrine: that corporate intentionality may 
exist independent of that of the corporation’s individual agents.140 But 
collective knowledge is simply an inadequate patch over a gaping 
hole in the respondeat superior standard. One commentator correctly 
observes that it is “a mechanical concept of mental state that fails to 
                                                                                                                 
134 821 F.2d 844 (1st Cir. 1987). 
135 Id. at 846–47; see also Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 
5311–5322 (2006) (providing reporting requirements and penalties for failure to comply for 
financial institutions involved in monetary transactions). 
136 Bank of New England, 821 F.2d at 848. 
137 Id. at 857. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 856. 
140 On this point, Jennifer Moore recognizes that the doctrine “only makes sense if 
employees are viewed as aspects of a corporate entity which is distinct from each of them, and 
the crime is understood not as the act of an individual, but as the act of the corporate entity 
. . . .” Moore, supra note 39, at 764. 
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reflect true corporate fault . . . .”141 Instead, it is a misguided 
extension of respondeat superior that merely pieces together remnants 
of individual knowledge reflecting individual culpability.142 Although 
unarguably a factor contributing to organizational culpability in some 
circumstances, individual culpability is simply not analogous with 
corporate culpability. For example, the aggregated culpability of four 
rogue, low-level agents may totally contradict that of a well-
intentioned organization. Thus, while collective knowledge is a 
conceptual step in the right direction, it is far from an adequate 
standard of genuine corporate culpability. 
2. Municipal Liability Under Section 1983 
Another instance of independent organizational fault is found in 
the tort doctrine of municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which 
creates a cause of action for deprivation of civil rights under color of 
state law.143 Overturning a previous holding that municipalities were 
immune from section 1983 liability, the Supreme Court in Monell v. 
Department of Social Services144 rejected respondeat superior theory 
and held that a municipality is liable only where a policy or custom of 
the municipality was the official policy or the “moving force” behind 
the deprivation.145 The Court explained that municipalities may incur 
liability in two ways: (1) where a policy that has been officially 
adopted or promulgated by a local governing body triggers an 
unconstitutional act;146 and (2) for “constitutional deprivations visited 
pursuant to a governmental ‘custom’ even though such a custom has 
not received formal approval through the body's official decision-
making channels.”147 The latter means of incurring liability sheds 
light on how courts may interpret informal organizational customs as 
reflecting culpable organizational action. 
The post-Monell courts found municipal custom in two 
circumstances. First, municipalities were held liable for 
“unconstitutional acts by policy-making officials, even where such 
acts were one-time events, not intended to establish city-wide 
                                                                                                                 
141 Brent Fisse, Restructuring Corporate Criminal Law: Deterrence, Retribution, Fault 
and Sanctions, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1141, 1189–90 (1983). 
142 See Bucy, supra note 36, at 1157 (“The fiction of collective intent, although perhaps 
needed, is simply a desperate, but disingenuous, application of the respondeat superior or MPC 
standards.”). 
143 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
144 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
145 Id. at 694. 
146 Id. at 690. 
147 Id. at 690–91. 
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routines.”148 This approach is akin to the MPC standard for corporate 
criminal liability and adheres to the principle that actions by high-
level decision makers more closely reflect organizational action than 
do acts by lower-level agents.149 However, the Court in Pembaur v. 
City of Cincinnati150 narrowed the definition of “policy-making 
official” to mean an official who is granted “final authority to 
establish municipal policy with respect to the action ordered,” 
limiting this line of liability.151 Additionally, municipalities were 
liable for unconstitutional acts resulting from indirect or informal 
policies or customs, which surfaced in a series of police brutality 
cases where courts held municipalities liable for civil rights violations 
“committed by police officers where the municipality had a policy or 
custom of failing properly to train, supervise, or discipline members 
of the police force.”152 However, over time “the Court has nearly 
eliminated . . . municipal[] liability on the basis of an informal, de 
facto policy . . . and has moved progressively toward the view that a 
municipal policy cannot exist in the absence of intentional choice by 
policy-making officials.”153  
Despite the subsequent limitation of its liability standards, Section 
1983 jurisprudence demonstrates the court’s willingness and ability to 
differentiate organizational from individual action and culpability. 
                                                                                                                 
148 Moore, supra note 39, at 773 (citing Williams v. Butler, 746 F.2d 431, 436 (8th Cir. 
1984) (citing cases in which one-time events were sufficient to constitute an unconstitutional act 
on the part of a municipality). 
149 Justice Stevens articulated this nexus from an organizational theory perspective in City 
of St. Louis v. Praprotnik: 
Every act of a high official constitutes a kind of ‘statement’ about how similar 
decisions will be carried out; the assumption is that the same decision would have 
been made, and would again be made, across a class of cases. Lower officials do not 
control others in the same way. Since their actions do not dictate the responses of 
various subordinates, those actions lack the potential of controlling governmental 
decision-making; they are not perceived as the actions of the city itself. 
485 U.S. 112, 171 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
150 475 U.S. 469 (1986) (plurality opinion). 
151 Id. at 481. 
152 Moore, supra note 39, at 774;  see also Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1392–95 
(4th Cir. 1987) (holding that a city could be liable for police misconduct where it failed to 
institute policies to ensure the safety of people in custody, failed to investigate claims of 
misconduct and discipline officers who were known to have committed abuse, and establish 
quota systems for arrests and citations that encouraged the use of force). 
153 Id. at 775; see also City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389–90 (1989) (explaining 
that although the finding of an informal policy is not absolutely precluded where misconduct 
results from the lack of an adequate training program, it will be extremely rare); Pembaur, 475 
U.S. at 483–84 (holding that “municipal liability under § 1983 attaches where—and only 
where—a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among various 
alternatives” by city policy-makers); City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823–24 
(1985) (holding that municipal liability can never be based on a single incident, instead 
requiring a pattern of conduct). 
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The courts applying the doctrine expressly rejected respondeat 
superior theory in favor of a doctrine of organizational fault and 
correctly recognize that organizational fault is at least in part located 
in the acts of high-echelon agents and in organizational customs and 
policies. Scholars use these same basic principles in deriving the 
corporate character or corporate ethos liability standards,154 
establishing the value of the guidance provided by the municipal 
liability doctrine in understanding a standard of genuine corporate 
culpability. 
3. Federal Prosecutorial and Sentencing Guidelines 
Prosecutors and judges, at least on paper, are guided by principles 
of true organizational fault at both the pre-indictment and post-
conviction stages in the federal prosecutorial and United States 
Sentencing Guidelines. The Principles of Federal Prosecution of 
Business Organizations provide prosecutors “guidelines and strategies 
that allow for the diversion from the criminal process corporations 
undeserving of criminal prosecution”155 in the absence of a legal 
standard that sufficiently fills this role. Nonetheless, the prosecutorial 
guidelines explicitly renounce strict vicarious liability for purposes of 
making the indictment decision156 in favor of a model for limiting 
prosecution to circumstances where the acts of the corporation’s 
agents are “fairly attributable to it.”157 
The Principles provide a list of factors to guide prosecutors in 
making the charging decision: 
1. The nature and seriousness of the offense . . . ; 
2. The pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the corporation, 
including the complicity in, or the condoning of, the 
wrongdoing by corporate management . . . ; 
3. The corporation’s history of similar misconduct . . . ; 
4. The corporation’s timely and voluntary disclosure of 
wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate in the 
investigation of its agents . . . ;  
                                                                                                                 
154 See infra Part II.C for a discussion of the corporate ethos or corporate character 
standards of organizational criminal liability. 
155 LAUFER, supra note 4, at 61. 
156 See PRINCIPLES, supra note 59, § 9–28.500 (“[I]t may not be appropriate to impose 
liability upon a corporation, particularly one with a robust compliance program in place, under a 
strict respondeat superior theory for the single isolated act of a rogue employee.”). 
157 Id. 
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5. The existence and effectiveness of the corporation’s pre-
existing compliance program . . . ;  
6. The corporation’s remedial actions . . . ; 
7. Collateral consequences . . . to shareholders . . . ; 
8 the adequacy of the prosecution of the individuals 
responsible for the corporation’s malfeasance; and 
9. The adequacy of remedies such as civil or regulatory 
enforcement actions . . . .158 
These guidelines clearly recognize principles of organizational 
behavior, corporate personhood, and independent culpability. For 
example, the Principles acknowledge that a corporation is more 
culpable where the misconduct was pervasive, rather than isolated, 
such as where it is “undertaken by a large number of employees” or 
“condoned by upper management.”159 Additionally, in considering the 
corporation’s history, prosecutors are directed that “[a] corporation, 
like a natural person, is expected to learn from its mistakes. A history 
of similar misconduct may be probative of a corporate culture that 
encouraged, or at least condoned, such misdeeds, regardless of any 
compliance programs.”160 Further, the Principles acknowledge the 
mitigating effect on organizational culpability resulting from a 
properly enforced compliance program161 and the possible sufficiency 
of prosecution of the individual wrongdoers in place of the 
corporation.162  
“Even a casual reading of [the Principles] leads to the conclusion 
that prosecutors used their vast discretion to craft a new set of liability 
rules, without legislative assistance, that largely abandon principles of 
vicarious liability and attempt to replace the substantive law with 
permissive guidance recognizing corporate personhood.”163 But this 
attempt fails as an adequate solution—the guidelines are merely, as 
they purport to be, guidelines. The Principles recognize that “[i]n 
making a decision to charge a corporation, the prosecutor generally 
has substantial latitude in determining when, whom, how, and even 
whether to prosecute . . . .”164 Prosecutorial discretion remains unduly 
                                                                                                                 
158 Id. § 9–28.300 (citations omitted).   
159 Id. § 9–28.500. 
160 Id. § 9–28.600 cmt. 
161 Id. § 9–28.800. 
162 Id. § 9–28.300. 
163 LAUFER, supra note 4, at 63. 
164 PRINCIPLES, supra note 59, § 9–28.300 cmt. 
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broad,165 and these guidelines provide neither the predictable 
guidance nor the protection to the accused of a binding liability 
standard. 
Post-trial, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations 
employ a culpability grading scheme utilizing aggravating and 
mitigating factors indicative of genuine organizational culpability to 
determine the fine upon conviction.166 Aggravating factors include: 
(1) involvement in or tolerance of the offense by high-level personnel 
or pervasive tolerance by substantial authority personnel; (2) prior 
criminal history; (3) violation of a judicial order or injunction; and (4) 
obstruction of justice.167 The mitigating factors include: (1) 
organizational self-reporting, cooperation, and acceptance of 
responsibility and (2) the presence of an effective compliance and 
ethics program.168 Again, the consideration of these factors, indicative 
of genuine organizational culpability, is a step in the right direction, 
but this consideration is not mandatory169 and simply takes place too 
late in the game, when criminal liability has already been imposed 
without a guaranteed analysis of organizational culpability.170 
The prosecutorial and sentencing guidelines demonstrate the 
system’s willingness and ability to consider genuine organizational 
intention and culpability, but do not provide adequate substitutes for a 
liability standard doing the same. The disconnect between the 
guidelines and liability standards is unjustified and “remains a critical 
problem of law reform . . . .”171 The system remains in need of 
liability standards considering genuine organizational culpability. 
C. Proposed Models of Genuine Corporate Culpability 
In response to the well-documented flaws of vicarious liability 
standards for imposing criminal liability on organizations, a number 
of theories have emerged that incorporate genuine corporate fault into 
                                                                                                                 
165 See supra notes 83–94 and accompanying text for a discussion of the problems with 
prosecutorial discretion in corporate crime. 
166 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5 (2010). 
167 Id. §§ (b)–(e). 
168 Id. §§ (f)–(g).  
169 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 243–44 (2005) (holding that treating the 
federal sentencing guidelines as mandatory violated the Sixth Amendment).  
170 See Bucy, supra note 36, at 1160 (“Under current standards of corporate liability, by the 
time the Sentencing Commission’s guidelines impact on a corporation, the factfinders have 
already convicted the corporation without adequate evidence of corporate intent.”); see also 
V.S. Khanna, Corporate Liability Standards: When Should Corporations Be Held Criminally 
Liable?, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1239, 1276 (2000) (observing that the organizational sentencing 
guidelines blur the line between the liability and sentencing stages as they incorporate “many of 
the factors and issues that we more commonly associate with the liability stage”). 
171 LAUFER, supra note 4, at 65. 
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the liability standards. One theory, proactive corporate fault, imposes 
liability where a corporation fails to make reasonable efforts to 
implement internal controls to prevent the commission of a crime.172 
Evidence of reasonable efforts to prevent organizational crime is 
gleaned from “(1) the development and implementation of safeguards 
to prevent crime commission and (2) the delivery of clear and 
convincing prohibitions of criminal behavior in the form of business 
conduct codes, ethics codes, and compliance training programs.”173 
This theory is a variation of the due diligence defense available under 
the MPC.174 The principal argument for this defense is deterrence-
based—it provides a proper incentive for the corporation to make 
efforts to encourage statutory compliance knowing that it will avoid 
criminal liability.175 
Although this standard incorporates the organization’s efforts to 
secure compliance, which is a key component of genuine 
organizational culpability, this component is merely one of many 
factors that contribute to organizational culpability. The treatment of 
due diligence as an end-all to the culpability analysis would 
compromise an arguably appropriate conviction where a number of 
aggravating culpability factors are present but the organization shows 
that it implemented an otherwise strong compliance program. The 
defense also opens the door for organizations to point to ostensibly 
air-tight compliance programs that, in substance, are mere shams to 
shield the organization from a conviction.176 
On the opposite end of the spectrum lies reactive corporate fault 
theory, which focuses on the organization’s reaction to the 
misconduct.177 Under this theory, the basis of the organization’s 
liability is the reasonableness of the organization’s reaction after it 
                                                                                                                 
172 Id. at 57. 
173 Id. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations incorporate a detailed 
definition of an effective compliance and ethics program for use in ascertaining the 
organization’s culpability score at the sentencing stage which could be used to guide the inquiry 
analysis at the liability stage. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 (2010) 
(stating the elements of an effective compliance and ethics program). 
174 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(5) (1962) (“[I]t shall be a defense if the defendant 
proves by a preponderance of evidence that the high managerial agent having supervisory 
responsibility over the subject matter of the offense employed due diligence to prevent its 
commission.”). 
175 See James R. Elkins, Corporations and the Criminal Law: An Uneasy Alliance, 65 KY. 
L.J. 73, 119 (1976) (“[T]he purpose for imposing liability is to encourage the corporation’s 
efforts to secure statutory compliance by its employees. That purpose is not served . . . where 
the corporation has in fact diligently supervised its employees and they violate the statute 
contrary to express instructions.”) (footnote omitted). 
176 See supra notes 59–66 and accompanying text for a discussion of organizational 
compliance games used to superficially avoid liability. 
177 See LAUFER, supra note 4, at 58 (defining reactive corporate fault). 
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discovers that one of its agents has committed a crime, and culpability 
and liability will be imposed for a “[f]ailure to undertake corrective 
measures in reaction to the discovery of an offense . . . .”178 Although 
it was initially suggested that reactive fault theory be reserved “only 
for less-serious offenses,”179 scholars subsequently advocated its use 
for all criminal offenses.180 The obvious flaw of reactive fault theory 
is that it “fails to capture a genuine corporate culpability to the extent 
that [it] reflects an entity’s response to the discovery of an illegal act 
rather than the commission of the act itself.”181 In other words, the ex 
post perspective of reactive fault diverges from the principle that the 
criminal act must coincide with a culpable mens rea.182 And similar to 
proactive fault, the narrow analysis of reactive fault falls well short of 
a full analysis of the factors contributing to organizational fault 
required to make a complete culpability assessment. 
Corporate ethos or corporate culture theory addresses the glaring 
limitations of proactive and reactive fault theories by   attributing 
fault to an organizational culture or personality that encourages 
criminal conduct by agents of the corporation.183 Evidence of such an 
ethos or culture may be demonstrated by a number of factors, 
including the corporate hierarchy, corporate goals and policies, efforts 
to ensure compliance with ethics codes and legal regulations, the 
indemnification of employees, the oversight role of the board of 
                                                                                                                 
178 Id. 
179 Id.  
180 See id. at 58 (citing Brent Fisse, Corporate Criminal Responsibility, 15 CRIM. L.J. 166, 
173–74 (1991) (suggesting that Australia adopt a standard of corporate criminal liability under 
which a corporation is liable where (1) the offense was committed by an agent; and (2) the 
corporation was at fault in at least one way, including, among other means based on proactive 
fault and corporate policy “by having a policy of failing to comply with a reactive duty to take 
preventative measures in response to having committed the external elements of the offence; or . 
. . by failing to take reasonable precautions or to exercise due diligence to comply with a 
reactive duty to take preventative measures in response to having committed the external 
elements of the offence.”)). 
181 LAUFER, supra note 4, at 60. 
182 See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 274 (1952) (quoting People v. Flack, 26 
N.E. 267, 270 (N.Y. 1891) (“[T]o constitute guilt there must be not only a wrongful act, but a 
criminal intention. Under our system . . . both must be found by the jury to justify a conviction 
for crime.”). 
183 See Bucy, supra note 36, at 1121 (discussing the definition of the corporate ethos 
standard); see also the Australian Criminal Code, which allows corporate criminal liability 
based on a “corporate culture . . . within the body corporate that directed, encouraged, tolerated 
or led to non-compliance with the relevant provision,” or the lack of “a corporate culture that 
required compliance. . . .”  Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) pt 2.5 s 12.3(2)(c)–(d), available at 
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/comlaw/Legislation/ActCompilation1.nsf/0/EA8F2A398EBE535C
CA2570B20015CC28/$file/CriminalCode1995_WD02.pdf. The Australian Criminal Code 
defines “corporate culture” as “an attitude, policy, rule, course of conduct or practice existing 
within the body corporate generally or in the part of the body corporate in which the relevant 
activities takes [sic] place.” Id. at s 12.3(6). 
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directors and how the corporation has reacted to past violations.184 As 
Bucy argues, a corporate ethos standard would clean up much of the 
over- and underinclusiveness of the respondeat superior standards by 
utilizing this range of organizational culpability factors to guide the 
inquiry.185 Testing this hypothesis, Bucy applies the model to five 
recurring circumstances in which corporate criminal matters arise:  
(1) cases where the corporation is closely held; (2) cases 
where higher echelon corporate agents commit the criminal 
act; (3) cases where lower echelon corporate agents commit 
the criminal act; (4) cases where corporate agents commit the 
criminal act in contravention of corporate policy or express 
instructions; and (5) cases where the court cannot identify the 
corporate agent who commits the criminal act.186  
Bucy generally hypothesizes that liability is probable in the first two 
circumstances primarily due to the close nexus between individual 
and organizational action.187 The corporate ethos standard generally 
avoids the counterintuitive imposition of liability in the fourth 
circumstance due to the lack of an ethos encouraging the rogue 
agent’s deviance.188 Liability in cases where a low-ranked agent 
commits the act and where the prosecution cannot locate a 
responsible agent hinges on a far less simplistic weighing of the 
universe of factors indicative of the organization’s culpability to 
determine whether they add up to an ethos that encouraged the 
misconduct.189 Using fact patterns falling under these two 
circumstances, Bucy weighs the organizational factors probative of an 
encouraging ethos, draws the liability line, and summarizes that 
                                                                                                                 
184 See supra notes 125–31 and accompanying text (summarizing the factors contributing 
to a corporate ethos);  see also Bucy, supra note 36, at 1129–47 (detailing the required inquiry 
into a corporate ethos that encourages criminal conduct). 
185 See Bucy, supra note 36, at 1150 (“The corporate ethos standard . . . . does not . . . 
simply transfer [the intent of individual agents] to an entity; rather, the corporate ethos standard 
looks beyond the corporate agent’s intent to all aspects of the corporation that could have 
encouraged the criminal act. This corporate ethos analysis will result in both more, and less, 
convictions than the current standards . . . .”). 
186 Id.  
187 See id. at 1151 (arguing that the corporate ethos standard will almost certainly yield a 
conviction where the corporation is closely held because “[w]hen the corporation is 
synonymous with one or a few individuals, its ethos is also synonymous with the criminal intent 
of those individuals”); id. at 1152(“[C]ourts are also likely to convict corporations whose higher 
echelon corporate agents commit the criminal conduct.”). 
188 Id. at 1154 (“[U]nder the corporate ethos test, liability almost certainly would not attach 
to the corporation in this category of cases.”). 
189 See id. at 1152–54 (applying the standard to cases where lower-echelon agents 
committed the misconduct); id. at 1156–57 (applying the standard to cases where a responsible 
agent cannot be located). 
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liability will result upon a finding of “corporate actions that make 
corporate liability appropriate.”190   
But just when is liability appropriate? Although the imposition of 
liability under the corporate ethos test more closely reflects true 
organizational culpability, the ambiguity of the result under this last 
circumstance demonstrates some clear shortcomings. Specifically, it 
fails to provide sufficiently concrete and predictable guidance as to 
how the variables contributing to an ethos are weighed in making the 
liability determination. More importantly, it fails to clarify the 
appropriate threshold beyond which it may be said that those 
variables actually encourage specific criminal violations requiring 
various mens rea for conviction, and how this threshold correlates 
with the mens rea in the statute at issue. It is merely a smell test. 
Consider the following questions: What evidence would prove a 
corporate ethos that encouraged a negligent crime? How does that 
requirement contrast with the ethos required to encourage willful or 
purposeful crime? How does the analysis resolve the liability of an 
organization showing characteristics reflecting both an ethos 
discouraging and encouraging the conduct at issue? When merely 
presented the body of variables that may contribute to a corporate 
ethos encouraging misconduct, absent more finite elements and 
clearer principles of application, the answers to these questions lack 
the predictability required of a sufficient liability standard.  
A fundamental flaw of the corporate-ethos standard, as with 
proactive and reactive fault, is it was “drafted with little concern for 
the basic requirements of criminal law.”191 These standards “all but 
abandon the requirement for finding a mens rea, or a mental state 
associated with corporate acts.”192 In litigating crimes committed by 
individuals, the prosecution presents direct and circumstantial 
evidence with reference to the specific mens rea required for 
conviction. The required mens rea provides guidance as to what 
evidence is relevant to the grade of culpability required for 
conviction.193 In contrast, these models of genuine organizational 
culpability do not require proof of an organizational mental state 
corresponding to the mental state required to establish each element 
                                                                                                                 
190 Id. at 1157. 
191 LAUFER, supra note 4, at 59. 
192 Id. 
193 For example, the prosecution seeking a murder conviction under the Model Penal Code, 
generally requiring that the defendant act with purpose or knowledge as to the death, must 
present evidence demonstrating the individual’s purpose or knowledge. See MODEL PENAL 
CODE § 210.2(1)(a) (1962) (“[C]riminal homicide constitutes murder when . . . it is committed 
purposely or knowingly.”). This evidence could include, for example, testimony and forensic 
evidence probative of motive and deliberate action. 
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of the offense. In the Arthur Andersen case, for example, the 
prosecution bore the burden of proving an agent’s knowingly corrupt 
persuasion of another to obstruct justice.194 Under the corporate-ethos 
standard, the prosecution would apparently have had to disregard the 
knowledge requirement written into the statute, and instead present 
evidence that an ethos existed at Andersen that generally encouraged 
the misconduct. This essentially reduces the mens rea to negligence 
for all offenses,195 setting aside the traditional limiting function of 
mental state requirements.196 
Although these “[e]fforts to move beyond elementary imputations 
of intention and action are a positive step in the development of a 
conceptually sound body of law,”197 they are in need of further 
modification. Because they entirely lack synergy with the present 
criminal statutes, “these models fail for reasons of 
implementation.”198 Laufer summarizes this shortcoming by 
observing that the models of genuine corporate culpability “are 
models of organizational liability rather than culpability . . . .”199 In 
other words, they are proposals for entirely new liability standards 
which necessarily disregard the liability standards set forth in the 
present criminal statutes. They simply “cannot be incorporated 
wholesale into the thousands of federal statutory provisions that allow 
for corporate criminal liability.”200 
In response to the observed limitations of these models, Laufer 
proposes a “constructive model of corporate fault” incorporating the 
principles of organizational culpability into a standard that, he argues, 
“make[s] use of existing standards . . . of culpability [and which is] 
capable of implementation without recodification of the federal 
criminal law or significant alteration of state law.”201 To accomplish 
this end, “constructive corporate fault” uses objective analysis in 
                                                                                                                 
194 See Indictment at 7, United States v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, Cr. No. CRH–02–121 
(S.D. Tex. March 7, 2002), 2002 WL 33949318 (indicting Arthur Andersen for “knowingly, 
intentionally and corruptly” persuading others to withhold, destroy, and alter documents). For 
the statutory basis of Andersen’s conviction, see supra note 102. 
195 See V.S. Khanna, Is the Notion of Corporate Fault a Faulty Notion?: The Case of 
Corporate Mens Rea, 79 B.U. L. REV. 355, 375 (1999) (casting many of the proposed models of 
genuine corporate culpability, including corporate ethos, proactive fault, and reactive fault as 
forms of negligence, “impos[ing] liability when the corporation’s internal procedures and 
policies are negligent in some way.”). 
196 See LAUFER, supra note 4, at 59 (“[M]ental state requirements limit the reach of the 
criminal law to those individuals and organizations that demonstrate a certain willfulness, 
recklessness, intention, purpose, or knowledge in committing a prohibited act.”). 
197 Id.  
198 Id. at 60. 
199 Id.  
200 Id. 
201 Id. 
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addition to the traditional subjective inquiry into the accused’s mental 
state.202 The objective is used in determining the reasonableness of 
imputing the agent’s actions to the corporation and whether it is fair 
or reasonable to assign a specific level of culpability.203 Laufer 
emphasizes the constructive perspective of the standard, which he 
summarizes as “constructive in the sense of construing facts, 
circumstances, conduct, and intentionality of the organization, 
prompting a fair or reasonable attribution of liability.” 204 
Necessitated by the fact that corporate action and intention are 
“almost always . . . derivative of individual or group action,”205 
Laufer’s theory of constructive fault “permits fact finders to move 
beyond the strictures of subjective evidence of culpability in order to 
find corporate states of mind that may be more reasonably deduced or 
inferred—with or without the assistance of subjective evidence of the 
defendant.”206 This model is a significant step toward a substantively 
and practically sound model through its maintenance of the centrality 
of mental states in criminal liability standards while recognizing the 
distinctions between individual and corporate mental states. Using the 
federal prosecutorial and sentencing guidelines as an inspiration,207 
Laufer seeks to place a liability standard more synergistic with the 
pre- and post-liability culpability inquiries.208 
The first step in the inquiry is to determine whether there was true 
corporate action for which to hold the corporation liable. Laufer 
suggests that:  
[c]ulpable organizational action may be identified through an 
objective test where it is determined that given the size, 
complexity, formality, functionality, decision-making 
process, and structure of the corporate organization, it is 
reasonable to conclude that the agents’ acts are those of the 
corporation. This reasonableness test is a threshold 
                                                                                                                 
202 See id. at 70–86 (describing Laufer’s suggested subjective-objective analysis for 
deriving corporate action and corporate intention). 
203 Id. at 71 (“Courts should rely on evidence of action and intention that . . . “prompt[s] a 
fair or reasonable attribution of liability.”). Laufer packages this standard as “hybrid fault” due 
to the synergies of the subjective and objective. Id. at 87–91.  
204 Id. at 71. 
205 Id. 
206 Id. at 72. 
207 Id. at 61. 
208 See id. at 71 (noting that this theory requires evidence that “reflect[s] the connectedness 
between an agent’s acts or intents and that of the organization,” as well as evidence that 
“captures an action or intention that is not attributable to any single agent or group but comes 
from the organization”); see also id. (arguing that this theory of constructive fault “lay[s] the 
groundwork for a substantive corporate criminal law . . . on par with that crafted by the 
Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations”). 
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assessment that separates cases in which corporate acts have 
occurred from individual noncorporate acts or secondary 
acts.209 
To make this reasonableness assessment, he defers to courts and 
juries to “develop a calculus, considering evidence relating to 
delegation, authorization, and reckless toleration, as well as the status 
of the agent who has acted . . . .”210 The strength of the agent-entity 
relationship, or the degree of organizational “authorship,” is central to 
ascertaining corporate action.211 Laufer recognizes that the strength of 
the relationship will preliminarily hinge on the status of the agent in 
the corporate hierarchy, but will be “far less mechanical” where the 
agent-entity relationship is more remote.212 In general terms, a finding 
of constructive corporate action is more probable where high level 
agents are involved in the violation, while less likely when the act 
involves lower level personnel whose connections to the corporation 
are more tenuous. 
Although this step takes care of the rogue agent problem, it risks 
completely unpredictable application and premature disposition of the 
liability analysis where an under-guided factfinder fails to find 
corporate action without assessing the remaining factors contributing 
to genuine organizational culpability, which is the integral stage of 
the analysis. The suggestion that courts and juries will “develop a 
calculus” with which to evaluate the expanse of organizational 
variables to determine whether a finding of corporate action is 
“reasonable” is oversimplified. This test is extremely malleable, in 
that it merely sets the table for unpredictable application because a 
jury has no familiar benchmark against which to make the suggested 
reasonableness judgment. This clumsiness may unduly compromise a 
full assessment of culpability by permitting the factfinder to drop a 
large portion of the culpability analysis in cases where it misguidedly 
resolves liability at the corporate action inquiry. In this respect, 
Laufer’s standard blurs the line between organizational action and 
culpability. A more effective inquiry should consider all variables that 
contribute to organizational action and intention before making the 
ultimate liability determination. Accordingly, it is more appropriate to 
consider the agent-entity relationship as a factor indicative of 
organizational culpability, not organizational action. If an agent acted 
                                                                                                                 
209 Id. at 72 (emphasis omitted). 
210 Id. at 72–73. 
211 See id. at 73 (“The stronger the agent-entity relationship, the more reasonable it is to 
consider an agent’s action to be a construction of the corporation’s.”). 
212 Id. 
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in some capacity connected to the organization, the action should be 
treated as organizational action and the analysis should proceed to the 
culpability assessment. 
Despite the room for improvement in Laufer’s standard for 
ascertaining organizational action, his model for assessing culpability 
effectively incorporates genuine organizational culpability while 
preserving grades of culpability used in the present criminal statutes. 
As a framework, he uses the Model Penal Code hierarchy of mental 
states—purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence—and 
identifies an array of organizational variables and necessary evidence 
that may be used to fit organizational conduct into those grades of 
culpability.213 While the federal law uses hundreds of mental states, 
those mental states may effectively be boiled down into the four MPC 
classifications commonly used in state criminal law.214  
The highest form of MPC culpability is purposive action, which 
occurs when it is one’s conscious object, or desire, to engage in an act 
or cause a particular result.215 Laufer summarizes purposive corporate 
action as existing in circumstances where “the corporation has . . . 
engaged in acts with a desire to bring about a certain, foreseeable 
result,” and where the offense entails attendant circumstances, where 
the corporation “at [a] minimum know[s] or believe[s] that these 
requisite circumstances exist.”216 Corporate purpose will appear as 
“(1) policies and practices that explicitly, implicitly, or through 
operation promote and encourage illegality, (2) efforts to ratify or 
endorse the violation of law, and (3) express or tacit authorization, 
approval, consent, or support of the illegality.”217 However, Laufer 
clouds the inquiry by suggesting that “[c]onstructive corporate 
culpability considers this evidence by asking whether the average 
corporation of like size, complexity, functionality, and structure, 
given the circumstances presented, purposely engaged in the illegal 
act.”218 It is unclear just how this added context aids the inquiry. In 
fact, this addition makes the analysis more abstract than necessary, 
exhibiting another flaw with the standard. This flaw aside, however, 
                                                                                                                 
213 See id. at 78–85. For a summary of these mental states and the organizational variables 
and evidence indicative of action falling within those variables see id. at 84–85. 
214 See id. at 78 (“With over one hundred different mental states . . . in Title 18 alone, it is 
not unreasonable to reexamine the integrity of the United States Code . . . [but] it does not defy 
classification. The . . . Model Penal Code provide[s] a hierarchy of culpable mental states for 
state law that captures many of the mental state distinctions found in the federal criminal law as 
well.”). 
215 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a)(i) (1962). 
216 LAUFER, supra note 4, at 78. 
217 Id. 
218 Id. 
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Laufer effectively sets forth the key evidence probative of corporate 
purpose. 
Laufer notes that most corporate crime cases exhibiting purposeful 
action will likely involve “small firms existing solely for the purpose 
of committing fraud.”219 While these would be the easiest cases 
because of the close nexus between high management and intentional 
misconduct, corporate purpose would also likely be present in larger 
firms exhibiting evidence of deliberate misconduct amongst high 
ranking corporate officers. 
Conduct undertaken with knowledge, the next-lowest level of 
culpability under the MPC, requires only that the actor is “practically 
certain that his conduct will cause such a result” if the element 
involves a result of the actor’s conduct, and “if the element involves 
the nature of [the actor’s] conduct or attendant circumstances,” an 
awareness that his conduct is of a certain nature or that certain 
circumstances exist.220 Courts generally have taken the definition 
further in interpreting positive knowledge to include willful 
ignorance, or deliberate avoidance of knowledge.221 Constructive 
corporate knowledge is determined by asking whether “[g]iven any 
evidence of actual awareness, permission, toleration, or willingness 
[with respect to the illegality at issue], would an average corporation 
of like size and structure have been aware of the nature of its 
conduct?”222 Laufer posits that corporate knowledge will encompass a 
significant portion of corporate crime cases, “especially cases where 
the most senior of management knows, condones, or tacitly approves 
of illegal acts.”223 
Next on the culpability hierarchy is recklessness, which requires 
that the actor “consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable 
risk” of harm which involves “a gross deviation from the standard of 
conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s 
situation.”224 Laufer presents the corporate recklessness inquiry as: 
“[c]onsidering the circumstances known, and the nature of the 
conduct committed, was the entity’s disregard of risks substantial and 
                                                                                                                 
219 Id. at 79. 
220 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b). 
221 See LAUFER, supra note 4, at 80 (noting that “[c]ourts have considered willful 
ignorance, or deliberately abstaining from knowledge, as actual or positive knowledge”). See 
also, e.g., United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 700 (9th Cir. 1976) (“To act ‘knowingly,’ 
therefore, is not necessarily to act only with positive knowledge, but also to act with an 
awareness of the high probability of the existence of the fact in question.”). 
222 See LAUFER, supra note 4, at 80. 
223 Id. 
224 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c). 
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unjustifiable?”225 Laufer takes an objective position on corporate 
recklessness, attributing the mental state where a corporation engages 
in “unreasonably risk-laden behavior without actual, positive 
knowledge of the illegality,”226 using as a reference the “risks that an 
average, comparable corporation would have known or been aware of 
in like circumstances.”227 Similar to his analysis of constructive 
corporate knowledge, Laufer focuses on senior management, finding 
recklessness where senior management must have known of its 
corporation’s unreasonably risk-laden behavior.228 The corporate-
recklessness standard also catches many of the cases of deliberate 
indifference in which executives arrange reporting patterns that 
insulate them from positive knowledge of information respecting 
potentially criminal conduct.229 
The lowest level of culpability, corporate negligence, is present 
“where an entity inadvertently creates a substantial and unjustifiable 
risk of which it ought to have been aware.”230 Negligence is an 
entirely objective standard under the MPC, providing for the best fit 
among the mental states with the objectively-driven constructive fault 
model.231 Laufer observes that corporate negligence catches, for 
example, cases where management is unaware, but should have 
known of fraud perpetrated by low- or mid-level employees.232  
                                                                                                                 
225 LAUFER, supra note 4, at 81. 
226 Id. 
227 Id. 
228 For example, Laufer cites the case against Emery Worldwide Airlines, an air cargo 
carrier that pled guilty to twelve violations of the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act in 
2003 for the placement by its employees of hazardous materials on its aircraft without properly 
notifying its pilots. Id. at 81–82. Laufer implies that a finding of corporate recklessness may be 
appropriate even though senior Emery executives lacked positive knowledge of the failures to 
notify because there were “credible allegations that management must have been aware of the 
problems with hazmat shipments and, at the very least, disregarded positive knowledge.” Id. at 
82. 
229 See id. (citing recent cases against a number of infamous executives as alleging, 
implicitly or explicitly, recklessness against the executives for their failures to “engage in the 
kind of diligent actions expected of a person in the position of a chief executive”); STONE, supra 
note 100, at 53: 
Directors and high-up officers of corporations . . . could not know of everything their 
organization was doing even if they tried—and often, preferring not to know, they 
arrange patterns of reporting so they cannot find out (or, at least, if they do find out, 
they find out only in such a way that it can never be proved). 
230 LAUFER, supra note 4, at 82. 
231 Under the Model Penal Code, an individual acts negligently where he “should be aware 
of a substantial and unjustifiable risk . . . of such a nature and degree that the actor’s failure to 
perceive it . . . involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person 
would observe in the actor’s situation.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d) (1962). 
232 LAUFER, supra note 4, at 82. Implying corporate negligence, Laufer cites a 2003 case 
against AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP in which it settled fraud charges alleging that its 
employees gave thousands of free samples of a prostate cancer drug to doctors, knowing that 
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Constructive corporate fault is the most conceptually sound of the 
outstanding academic models for incorporating genuine 
organizational culpability into the corporate criminal law. It 
represents a significant stride toward an effective marriage of the 
understanding of independent organizational action and intention and 
the practical and normative necessity of maintaining the graded mens 
rea requirements in the existing criminal law. Laufer’s disposal of the 
exclusively subjective mens rea is a significant step in moving from 
the limits of vicarious liability, and in lessening the burden on 
factfinders to distill evidence down to an organizational mental state. 
Thus, insofar as the objective element permits the use of reasonable 
objective inferences in the analysis, it is undeniably useful.  
However, this model requires further refinement to ensure accurate 
and predictable application. Although it fits practically into the 
existing criminal law, it fails to give due consideration to the judges 
and juries who will be charged with its implementation.  The general 
weakness lies in the standard’s idealistic use of an objective standard, 
making the already complex task of determining a corporate mental 
state more complex than necessary. This unnecessary complexity 
comes from two sources: (1) the reasonableness test required in 
determining whether the action at issue was corporate action; and (2) 
the mental state inquiries requiring the factfinder to determine the 
mens rea of a corporation by asking whether, considering the 
circumstances, a similar corporation engaged in the conduct at issue 
possessed the required mental state. The former merely adds an 
unnecessary inquiry which may be more easily and properly absorbed 
into the mental state analysis.233 Similarly, the reasonableness 
judgments required in the mental state analysis confuse the inquiry by 
asking jurors to consider whether an “average corporation”234 would 
possess the required mental state. This benchmark adds unnecessary 
and unhelpful perspective to the already complex and abstract concept 
of corporate mental states. 
This complexity stems from traditional methods of making 
assessments of culpability in tort and criminal law, in which the jury 
is commonly asked to jump in to the mind of the accused or to make 
                                                                                                                 
 
Medicare and Medicaid would be billed for the samples, and offered other illegal inducements 
pursuant to its aggressive marketing plan. Id. at 82–83. The company acknowledged the fraud 
but pointed out that it was unknown to senior management, and the prosecution did not single 
out individually culpable employees. Id. at 83. 
233 For a more in-depth discussion of Laufer’s standard of constructive action, see supra 
notes 201–10. 
234 LAUFER, supra note 4, at 78. 
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judgments from the perspective of a reasonable person.235 This task, 
while demanding, is feasible because the jurors are human beings. 
Armed with their own experiences, their understandings of human 
thought, decision making, and reaction, and their abilities to consider 
different perspectives and circumstances, jurors can be reasonably 
expected to develop benchmarks against which they may estimate 
another individual’s mental state. However, for jurors to step into the 
shoes of an “average corporation” to make corporate mental state 
determinations is much less straight-forward. For example, it is not 
unrealistic to assume that a jury may simply fail to grasp how a 
corporation, an intangible entity, can possess knowledge, a 
traditionally individualistic concept, creating an understanding barrier 
that would trigger improper application. A jury in this situation would 
likely be incapable of understanding how the differences in “size, 
complexity, formality, functionality, decision making process and 
structure”236 between corporations affect the threshold for a 
corporation’s formation of knowledge.237 Constructive corporate fault 
asks too much of the factfinder if it expects any consistency in 
application, which compromises its substantive strength. But with 
further refinement, Laufer’s conceptualization may be parlayed into a 
more user-friendly standard retaining its overall substantive strength.  
III. IMPLEMENTING A MORE WORKABLE STANDARD: THE SENIOR 
MANAGEMENT MENS REA 
A. The Senior Management Perspective 
Among the models of genuine corporate culpability, constructive 
culpability strikes the best balance between a full consideration of 
genuine organizational culpability and the practical and normative 
necessity of maintaining the grades of culpability used in the existing 
criminal statutes. But while constructive culpability is suitable in 
theory, its potential efficacy is compromised for reasons of 
implementation. As Bucy recognizes, any new standard of corporate 
culpability will naturally present difficulties in administration 
compared to the present liability standards.238 Laufer’s model, 
                                                                                                                 
235 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d) (using the reasonable person benchmark in 
the standard for criminal negligence). 
236 LAUFER, supra note 4, at 72 (emphasis removed). 
237 This incapability is understandable in the abstract task of attributing traditionally human 
mental states to an organization with potentially thousands of constituents and various sources 
of behavior, culture, policy and culpability. 
238 Bucy, supra note 36, at 1180 (countering the likely criticism that courts will find the 
corporate ethos standard more difficult to administer, stating that “[i]n part, the difficulty will 
stem from unfamiliarity with a new standard of liability . . . [and] from the fact that the 
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however, presents unnecessary implementation difficulties by 
requiring the factfinder to make culpability judgments using the 
perspective of the average corporation, a daunting task for an 
organizational theorist, let alone a group of lay jurors. However, it is 
possible to use the groundwork of constructive fault to shift 
perspective in a way that will add clarity while maintaining due 
consideration of genuine organizational culpability and graded mental 
states. 
Instead of adopting the unduly abstract perspective of a 
comparable corporation, this Note proposes a model requiring the 
factfinder to adopt the perspective of senior management, as a group, 
to determine corporate action and mens rea. This shift provides 
increased workability compared to constructive fault, most generally, 
by relieving the courts of much of the burden of analyzing evidence 
of actual knowledge of corporate agents and other evidence of 
genuine culpability and using that evidence to determine mental states 
of a complex, abstract, and intangible entity. Specifically, the senior 
management mens rea (SMMR) first simplifies Laufer’s suggested 
model for deriving corporate action by eliminating the factfinder’s 
task of evaluating an organization’s structure to determine whether a 
reasonable factfinder may determine that the agents’ acts are those of 
the organization. Instead, this model presumes corporate action 
through senior management’s encouraged corporate culture; its 
development and implementation of organizational goals, strategy, 
policy, and procedures; and its general roles of delegation, 
management, and oversight. Second, the model guides the factfinder 
to consider evidence of culpability, using reasonable, nonsubjective 
inferences to determine culpability from a more concrete, familiar 
perspective than an “average [comparable] corporation”239 by instead 
looking to the body of individuals representing senior management. 
This approach effectively balances the benefits of: (1) the court’s 
familiarity with determining the mental states of individuals, (2) the 
jury’s likely ability to better understand and consistently apply 
corporate culpability from the perspective of a body of individuals 
using Laufer’s suggested nonsubjective culpability inferences, (3) the 
consideration of evidence reflecting genuine organizational 
culpability, and (4) the integration of organizational culpability into 
the standing criminal statues employing grades of culpability. 
                                                                                                                 
 
corporate ethos standard is more fact-sensitive than are the current standards of liability”). 
239 LAUFER, supra note 4, at 78. 
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The use of senior management action and intention as a proxy for 
corporate action and intention is well-supported by the understanding 
of management’s role in corporate deviance. In order to ensure that 
this model does not embody the disconnect between individual and 
corporate action and culpability inherent to vicarious liability, it is 
crucial that it require a strong connection between the action and 
intention of management and the organization, or what Laufer refers 
to as organizational “authorship.”240 The inherently tight relationship 
between the actions of senior management and organizational 
misbehavior reveals that adoption of the perspective of senior 
managers, particularly top executives, provides for this authorship. 
Top executives have long been viewed as the central force behind 
corporate wrongdoing. In fact, one group of scholars points 
exclusively to senior management as the impetus of corporate 
deviance, defining corporate violence as “behavior producing an 
unreasonable risk of physical harm to consumers, employees, or other 
persons as a result of deliberate decision-making by corporate 
executives or culpable negligence on their part.”241 Although it may 
be unrealistic to lay the entire blame for corporate deviance on top 
management, the recurring understanding is that management plays 
the leading role in unethical and illegal corporate behavior.242 Thus, 
the consensus view emerging in academia is that “corporate 
wrongdoing is more often the result of actions or inactions, deliberate 
or inadvertent, by the top managers of the organization.”243 
At the same time, an effective standard must account for the fact 
that the influence of those in top management often trickles down 
from the highest ranks into the ranks of lower-senior and middle 
management, either deliberately or inadvertently, in the form of 
expectations and objectives driven at profit maximization,244 
                                                                                                                 
240 Id. at 73 (“The strength of authorship determines the reasonableness of [imputing the 
actions of agents to the corporation].”). 
241 CLINARD & YEAGER, supra note 8, at 9 (emphasis added) (alteration in original) 
(quoting John Monahan et al., Corporate Violence: Research Strategies for Community 
Psychology, in CHALLENGES TO THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 117 (Daniel Adelson & 
Theodore Sarbin eds., 1979)). 
242 See CLINARD & YEAGER, supra note 8, at 59 (observing that “superiors [are 
consistently] ranked as the primary influence in unethical decisionmaking”); id. at 60 (citing 
confidential interviews conducted with a number of board chairmen and senior executives and 
observing a consensus that “the top management, particularly the chief executive officer, sets 
[the] ethical tone”); LAUFER, supra note 4, at 125 (arguing that “[o]f all internal factors 
accounting for corporate crime, not one comes close in importance to the role of top 
management in tolerating if not shaping a corporate culture that allows for deviance”). 
243 Anthony J. Daboub et al., Top Management Team Characteristics and Corporate 
Illegal Activity, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 138, 138–39 (1995). 
244 See, e.g., CLINARD & YEAGER, supra note 8, at 47 (“Nonetheless, the desire to increase 
or maintain current profits is the critical factor in a wide range of corporate deviance . . . .”); 
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permitting management to avoid positive knowledge of the deviance 
below.245 An understanding of this flow-through phenomenon is 
crucial to ensuring consideration of the full range of evidence 
probative of the SMMR. The SMMR accounts for this phenomenon 
by using Laufer’s approach in considering the two critical sources of 
organizational culpability: (1) the subjective knowledge of senior 
management sufficiently connected to the organization, which reflects 
organizational culpability; and (2) circumstantial evidence, in the 
form of the factors contributing to genuine organizational culpability, 
which provides for reasonable inferences of culpability amongst 
senior management.246 This approach effectively considers individual 
managers’ subjective culpability while restricting their ability to 
avoid liability by avoiding actual knowledge of deviance.   
Of course, the SMMR requires a body of senior management 
against which to present and consider evidence. Given the broad 
range of corporate managerial structures, from closely held 
organizations utilizing only a handful of senior managerial positions 
to the decentralized multinational corporation operating numerous 
                                                                                                                 
 
Bucy, supra note 36, at 1134 (“[I]nstitutional goals can encourage, or discourage, illegal activity 
by corporate employees.”). 
245 The line between advertence and inadvertence of this trickle-down effect may be blurry, 
as some argue that “it is not uncommon for top management to lose control and direct 
supervision over subunits as well as subordinate employees once an organization reaches a 
certain size, level of complexity, and specialization.” LAUFER, supra note 4, at 125. Clinard and 
Yeager observe that the size of many large corporations: 
[R]equires that corporations delegate decisionmaking and disperse their operating 
procedures in order to produce efficiently. This process is accompanied by the 
establishment of elaborate hierarchies based on authority position and functional 
duties. In addition, over time the number of job categories requiring specialists or 
professionals has expanded greatly as corporations have grown and technology has 
developed. These factors—size, delegation, and specialization—combine to produce 
an organizational climate that allows the abdication of a degree of personal 
responsibility for almost every type of decision, from the most inconsequential to 
one that may have a great impact on the lives of thousands. 
CLINARD & YEAGER, supra note 8, at 44.  
  On the other hand, armed with this defense of organizational complexity, management 
has become adept at avoiding actual exposure to deviance of their subordinates, at least in terms 
of its subjective knowledge of wrongdoing. See, e.g., CLINARD & YEAGER, supra note 8, at 44 
(“Executives at the higher levels can absolve themselves of responsibility by the rationalization 
that illegal means of attaining their broadly stated goals had been devised without their 
knowledge . . . .”); LAUFER, supra note 4, at 125 (“[T]op management can be quite successful in 
demonstrating its ignorance of middle management or subordinate employee deviance.”). 
246 Laufer emphasizes the utility of reasonable inferences of culpability, although he 
frames the use of these inferences in terms of directly establishing a corporate mental state 
under his theory of constructive corporate fault. See LAUFER, supra note 4, at 72 (“Constructive 
fault permits fact finders to move beyond the strictures of subjective evidence of culpability in 
order to find corporate states of mind that may be more reasonably deduced or inferred—with or 
without the assistance of subjective evidence of the defendant.”).  
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autonomous divisions, all of which may have multiple subdivisions 
and tiers of high-level management,247 a bright-line standard drawing 
the line around an appropriate senior management group is virtually 
impossible. In consideration of this difficulty, as an overriding 
principle, the prosecution should be provided flexibility in selecting 
the group about whose conduct and mens rea it will present evidence. 
Although limits must be set in order to prevent the prosecution from 
focusing on too low a level of management, or improperly focusing 
too closely on the individual culpability of a small number of 
managers,248 the prosecution should be permitted to target its 
presentation of evidence at a more manageable representative group 
of management. Most importantly, this narrowing function will 
permit the prosecution to direct the jury’s attention to the most 
relevant group of management according to the locus of the deviance 
and evidence of culpability. Absent this ability, it would likely be 
easier for the defense to divert attention to an unduly broad 
representative group or to a group substantially irrelevant to the 
culpability determination.  
As a lower limit, culpability may be considered from the 
perspective of the level of senior management no lower than the level 
that significantly participates in the development and implementation 
of the strategic or operational policies and procedures of the 
organization, or for the division or department of the organization in 
which the level of management engages in its functions. Again, this 
lower limit ensures that the culpability determination is only made 
with reference to a body of management sufficiently representative of 
the actions and intentions of the organization. The highest 
management bracket, of course, consists of the highest executives and 
the board of directors. But it bears emphasis that the prosecution 
should be permitted to focus on the levels or divisions of management 
most closely tied to the deviance.249 The understanding underlying 
                                                                                                                 
247 See CLINARD & YEAGER, supra note 8, at 24 (describing the structural features of the 
modern large corporation as pointed out by Drucker as being originated by General Motors, 
which include “decentralization into autonomous divisions, each a business of its own; [and] 
full responsibility of the divisional manager for the performance of his division . . . ”). 
248 It may be appropriate for the prosecution to emphasize the individual culpability of a 
small number of high-level managers, or even a single individual.  
249 Presumably, the ability to trim the representative group on the high end will prove most 
useful in prosecutions of complex, multi-divisional organizations where the deviance is focused 
in one of the divisions. As a simple example, suppose Corporation X has two autonomous 
divisions, A and B, each of which is run by a body of high-level executives. X is prosecuted for 
fraud perpetrated within division B. The prosecution would, of course, present evidence 
probative of culpability within division B, and absent any probative evidence of culpability 
attributable to the higher ranks of X, would likely prefer to target the senior management of 
division B. Without this ability, the defense would likely attempt to re-orient the jury by 
presenting mitigating evidence based on the general policies of X, a lack of knowledge of the 
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this ability to focus the analysis is that it is not necessary to prove that 
the entire body of senior management is culpable as long as 
culpability exists in a sufficiently representative management group.  
Narrowing the representative group of senior management will not 
compromise a proper assessment of genuine organizational 
culpability. At first glance, it may appear as though this practice risks 
taking a step back toward principles of vicarious liability by focusing 
too closely on the culpability of a small group, or even on a single 
individual. This is simply not the case. First, the determination of the 
SMMR is not limited to individual knowledge, but will also consider 
as circumstantial evidence the universe of organizational variables 
understood to aggravate or mitigate organizational culpability, in 
order to reach reasonable inferences of mens rea.250 And even where 
an act is committed by a limited group of management, or even a 
single senior manager, and the prosecution hinges heavily on 
individual subjective culpability, the threshold classification as a 
sufficiently senior manager ensures a close nexus between individual 
and organization such that the organization is appropriately held 
responsible for the act. This nexus is still present in cases where the 
focus is shifted to lower-level managers because higher levels of 
management, and ultimately, the organization, are impliedly culpable 
for delegating managerial power and responsibilities. And presuming 
that these lower levels of management are behaving in response to 
pressures from above, not on exclusively individual motives, is 
fair.251 Consequently, due to this organization-agent connection, the 
organization is itself blameworthy and appropriately held criminally 
liable where the culpability for the deviance is focused among lower-
ranking senior management. 
Inevitably, there will be an argument on both sides as to whether 
or not a specific level of management or an individual is truly “senior 
management.” But drawing this line is not central to the ultimate 
liability determination. This exhibits an important implementation 
advantage of this model. This model does not rely upon the murky, 
yet make-or-break line-drawing between whether the acts and 
intentions of an agent, or group of agents demonstrate an adequate 
nexus to the organization or not, as is the case under the MPC 
                                                                                                                 
 
highest management of X, and other “mitigating” factors that fail in reality to mitigate the 
culpability of the senior management of division B. This would only muddle and draw out an 
already complex and long trial. 
250 See infra Part III.C for a full discussion of the SMMR. 
251 See supra notes 238–40 and accompanying text (discussing the understanding that 
deviance is commonly filtered down through the ranks from the most senior management). 
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approach and Laufer’s standard of constructive fault.252 Under the 
SMMR model, the means of establishing this nexus is simplified, yet 
is equally, if not more effective. Even if misconduct is focused among 
a group of lower-ranked agents, or committed by an individual in a 
position toeing the line of senior management, instead of engaging in 
the unnecessarily painstaking task of drawing this line to attribute an 
agent’s mental state (under the MPC) or move to the corporate mens 
rea analysis (under Laufer’s constructive fault), the senior 
management group can always be modified to provide some body of 
individuals that can be examined for the requisite culpability. It will 
be undeniably advantageous to the prosecution if an individual 
heavily involved in the misconduct qualifies as a member of senior 
management. But under the SMMR, this hair-splitting qualification 
will never take precedence over the ultimately dispositive analysis of 
organizational culpability. Avoiding this unnecessarily convoluted 
line-drawing exemplifies one of the core utilities of this standard.  
B. Senior Management Action 
Requiring the factfinder to draw the arbitrary distinction as to 
whether or not specific conduct is reasonably attributed to the 
organization is neither practical nor necessary. Laufer’s analysis in 
making this determination focuses on the strength of the agent-entity 
relationship.253 The reliance on this relationship makes sense: the 
stronger the relationship between the agent and the entity, the more 
the agent’s actions reflect the culture, policies, and procedures of the 
organization and, in turn, the more just it is to hold the organization 
liable for the agent’s conduct. This principle has long been embodied 
in the MPC’s high managerial agent standard,254 and should maintain 
its place in the liability determination. The jury, however, should not 
have to wade through the universe of organizational variables 
contributing to an organization’s “authorship” of its agents’ actions. 
A more workable standard for deriving organizational action is 
reached, somewhat ironically, with inspiration from the respondeat 
superior standard in its broad, seemingly catch-all state.255 Under the 
                                                                                                                 
252 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(c) (1962) (requiring that the offense be “authorized, 
requested, commanded, performed, or recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or by a high 
managerial agent acting in behalf of the corporation within the scope of his office or 
employment”); supra Part II.C (describing Laufer’s standard requiring a finding of corporate 
action, which must be derived from the balancing of a number of organizational factors to 
determine the relationship between the agent and the entity). 
253 See LAUFER, supra note 4, at 73 (“The reasonableness test looks to the relationship of 
the agent to the entity to determine [attribution].”). 
254 See supra Part I.A for a discussion of the MPC standard. 
255 Due to progressive expansion of the reach of respondeat superior, it essentially catches 
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suggested standard, a corporation is presumed to have acted through 
its senior management where any agent, or any group of agents, 
performs the illegal activity while carrying out a job-related activity, 
except where the agent or agents engage in illegal acts in which the 
corporation is an intended victim of the activity for an exclusively 
personal benefit. While inspired by respondeat superior, this broad 
standard mends some of its flaws. It first removes the unnecessary, 
hair-splitting distinction between what is and is not within an agent’s 
scope of employment. In determining whether an agent was acting 
within his authority while perpetrating the illegal act, both sides will 
present evidence as to the company’s express and implied policies, 
coupled with evidence of toleration, ratification, or encouragement of 
the activity to prove that the agent was or was not acting within the 
scope of his authority. This is precisely the type of evidence that will 
be presented to prove the SMMR. So principles of authority are 
implicitly embodied in the senior management culpability analysis.256 
As long as the corporation meets the required mental state through an 
analysis of its genuine organizational culpability, it is appropriately 
held liable for the actions of its agents, so a strict analysis of the 
agent’s authority is superfluous. Additionally, this standard disposes 
of the problematic “for the benefit of the corporation” with which 
courts have consistently struggled.257 And similar to the “scope of 
employment” element, a corporate benefit will be impliedly 
considered in determining the SMMR in certain circumstances; 
specifically, it will be considered where senior management pressures 
influence agents’ deviance. However, the corporate victimization 
                                                                                                                 
 
all acts committed while carrying out a job-related activity regardless of any real benefit to the 
corporation. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 128 (5th Cir. 1962) (“There 
have been many cases . . . in which the corporation is criminally liable even though no benefit 
[to the corporation] has been received in fact.”); Developments, supra note 77, at 1250 (arguing 
that the scope of employment requirement has evolved to mean “little more than that the act 
occurred while the offending employee was carrying out a job-related activity”). 
256 In response to critics’ claims that a liberal interpretation of the “scope of employment” 
element is required to prevent corporations from avoiding liability through an express 
prohibition on all illegal activity by the board of directors, Bucy asserts that the corporate ethos 
standard does not disregard the “scope of employment” requirement, but instead, “is a rigorous 
application of this requirement. If the ethos of the corporation encouraged the agent to commit 
the illegal conduct, the agent’s acts are within her de facto authority. If the corporate ethos did 
not encourage her acts, they are outside her authority.” Bucy, supra note 36, at 1148–49. 
257 See id. at 1149 (“Even if courts wanted to stringently impose this requirement, it is 
unclear how they could. It seems impossible to apply literally. For example, if an employee 
takes bribes for favors to corporate customers, has the corporation benefitted? If so, how do the 
courts measure the benefit? Do the disadvantages, such as poor relationships with other 
customers, a criminal conviction, detrimental publicity, internal dissension, and poor morale, 
outweigh the benefit?”). 
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limitation quickly disposes of cases in which the agent targets the 
corporation exclusively for his personal benefit.258  
Finally, this standard for determining corporate action is an 
improvement over Laufer’s objective reasonableness analysis. Like 
Laufer’s standard, the presumption of senior management action 
involves the finding of a “constructive corporate act”259 because it 
derives corporate action from senior management’s development and 
implementation of organizational policies, procedures, and strategy, 
its delegation of authority, and its general management and oversight 
of corporate operations. But this standard removes the risk that judges 
and juries will stumble over the development and implementation of a 
flexible (and likely bendable and breakable) factor-driven 
reasonableness test to derive corporate action. Instead of requiring the 
factfinder to undertake an entirely unfamiliar inquiry into the “size, 
complexity, formality, functionality, decision-making process, and 
structure of the corporate organization”260 to determine whether it is 
reasonable to derive corporate action, their efforts should focus on 
determining whether the agent’s actions and the surrounding 
circumstances demonstrate the required level of culpability. At the 
end of the day, the organization only acts through its agents,261 so 
these acts should be treated as those of the corporation until it proves 
that it is not culpable for them. Without compromising the substantive 
merits of the consideration of the organizational variables 
contributing to genuine corporate culpability, which will be 
considered by a jury armed with a more concrete senior management 
perspective, this model of corporate action provides a more workable 
approach assuring that liability will not be dismissed without due 
consideration of culpability as a result of an unduly complex standard 
for determining corporate action.  
C. The Senior Management Mens Rea 
Under the SMMR, if the presumption of senior management action 
is established, the factfinder must then determine the existence or 
nonexistence of a  concurrent mental state. The SMMR model builds 
                                                                                                                 
258 Clinard and Yeager refer to these such cases, where “a corporate official . . . gains a 
personal benefit in the commission of a crime against the corporation . . . ” as occupational 
crime, not corporate crime. CLINARD & YEAGER, supra note 8, at 18. 
259 Laufer refers to action and intention under his model of constructive corporate fault as 
“constructive corporate action” and “constructive culpability.” LAUFER, supra note 4, at 77. 
260 Id. at 72. 
261 See 1 WILLIAM MEAD FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF 
CORPORATIONS § 5 (2006 & Supp. 2011) (noting that one of the “distinguishing characteristics 
of a corporation” is that it “is capable of acting through . . . its agents . . . ”). 
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from the proposed schemes of genuine organizational culpability, 
drawing its primary inspiration from Laufer’s incorporation of these 
principles into the Model Penal Code mental states.262 The SMMR 
liability determination is made by considering whether senior 
management, considering individual subjective knowledge and 
reasonable inferences of culpability using circumstantial evidence 
derived from facts and circumstances manifesting independent 
organizational culpability, acted with purpose, knowledge, 
recklessness or negligence with respect to the corresponding acts and 
attendant circumstances required for conviction in the relevant 
statute.263 Using the understanding of independent organizational 
culpability and the implementation-based necessity of the 
incorporation of graded mental states, this standard adds an additional 
implementation advantage through its focus on a tangible body of 
individuals against which to consider evidence. 
The model borrows, in large part, Laufer’s marriage of the 
corporate agents’ subjective knowledge and objective manifestations 
and reasonable inferences of organizational culpability.264 The 
underlying goal of this standard mirrors that of constructive corporate 
fault—“[to] search . . .  for the best possible estimation of a corporate 
mental state through actual knowledge, as well as through reasonable 
inferences.”265 But it does so in a more practical manner by shifting 
away from Laufer’s idealistic assumption that judges and juries can 
wade through the complexities of the corporate form to make 
consistent, well-reasoned objective determinations as to the mental 
state of the abstract corporate “person.” Under SMMR, the estimation 
of the corporate mental state is reached through an examination of the 
actual knowledge of senior managers and the use of factors 
contributing to organizational culpability as circumstantial evidence 
of their culpability. The SMMR analysis will use, in large part, the 
general organizational variables and examples of evidence probative 
of the respective levels of corporate culpability in the existing 
conceptualizations of genuine organizational culpability.266 
                                                                                                                 
262 See supra Part II.C for a discussion of current proposed models of genuine 
organizational culpability. 
263 The respective grades of culpability maintain the MPC definitions of the respective 
grades of culpability. See supra notes 215–19 and accompanying text (purpose); notes 220–23 
and accompanying text (knowledge); note 224–29 and accompanying text (recklessness); note 
230–32 (negligence). 
264 See LAUFER, supra note 4, at 72 (describing the use of subjective and objective 
inquiries into corporate culpability under Laufer’s model of constructive corporate fault). 
265 Id. 
266 See id. at 84–85 (summarizing the organizational variables and examples of evidence 
proving the respective constructive mental states under Laufer’s model of constructive corporate 
fault). Other examples of aggravating and mitigating evidence of culpability are summarized in 
 1/5/2012 3:02:17 PM 
322 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:1 
The strong underpinnings of the use of objective, reasonable 
inferences and approximations under this model bear further 
emphasis. An exclusive reliance on the individual, subjective 
culpability of senior managers, aside from being nearly factually 
impossible, would compromise the merits of the standard. Laufer 
defends the use of objective approximations of intent on the basis that 
it is difficult, if not impossible, to derive a mental state by focusing on 
individuals’ subjective thought processes using direct evidence.267 
But this difficulty is commonly overcome in the context of criminal 
law through the use of reasonable inferences: 
We are accustomed to this burden, however, and so do not 
easily realize that, truly, direct proof of intent is impossible 
and we have simply become comfortable with approximations 
that do not overcome the impossibility of our task. . . . 
However, our inability to directly prove intent does not cause 
us to reject the entire concept, or given sufficient 
circumstantial evidence, to question whether the factfinders 
have accurately deduced a person’s intent.268 
When framed against the criminal law’s attempts at the factually 
impossible, it is evident that the suggested use of approximations to 
ascertain the “mental state” of a group of management is not a 
departure from principles of individual subjective determinations of 
mens rea, but instead, a continuation of the practical necessity of 
balancing aggravating and mitigating circumstantial evidence to reach 
a comfortable estimation. Accordingly, the SMMR model gives the 
factfinder the flexibility to consider senior management’s mental state 
with reference to circumstantial evidence using the body of factors 
contributing to organizational culpability. This, in turn, enables a 
reasonable approximation as to whether senior management acted 
purposefully, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently. Thus, the use of 
objective inferences to deduce a SMMR gives full effect to the 
consideration of the organizational variables contributing to 
independent organizational culpability.  
                                                                                                                 
 
the discussion of Bucy’s corporate ethos standard, supra text accompanying notes 125–30, and 
in the summary of the factors which prosecutors are urged to consider before seeking an 
indictment of an organization. See supra note 154 and accompanying text. 
267 LAUFER, supra note 4, at 87 (“[O]ne primary rationale for resorting to reasonableness 
judgments in determining culpability . . . is the difficulty, and sometimes impossibility, of 
establishing subjective mental processes by direct evidence.”).   
268 Bucy, supra note 36, at 1178 (emphasis added). 
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The aim of SMMR is, of course, a close estimation of the 
organization’s mental state—it is an approximation of senior 
management’s culpability as a body, and thus will not reflect a perfect 
assessment of every senior manager’s individual culpability. 
Accepting this imperfection is crucial to properly implementing this 
model. Certainly, proof of culpable mental states among those 
individuals in the highest ranks of an organization will weigh heavily 
in the culpability assessment because those individuals bear the 
closest nexus to the will of the organization.269 Similarly, the scope of 
the culpability analysis will be necessarily focused where deviance is 
focused in a division of the organization which is directly overseen by 
a concentrated group of senior managers or where misconduct is 
actually committed by such a group.270 But courts must be careful to 
avoid falling into the constraints inherent to the strict imputation of 
individual mental states by maintaining the central understanding of 
this model—culpability of individual agents, in many instances, is 
only a piece of the SMMR and is not a prerequisite to its finding. 
Accordingly, the presence of evidence aggravating the culpability of 
senior management, and ultimately the organization, inevitably will 
not speak to the subjective mental state of every involved senior 
manager with respect to the deviance.  
For example, assume that agents in middle management commit a 
fraud, and the prosecution seeks to prove knowledge of the acts on the 
part of twenty senior managers. The central evidence of senior 
management’s knowledge is that five senior managers responsible for 
the oversight of the subordinate agents appeared to turn a blind eye or 
failed to properly enforce controls preventing the misconduct of 
subordinates, and that the corporation exhibited a history of similar 
misconduct. Not every manager tolerated the misconduct, and it is 
possible that not every manager even knew that his or her colleagues 
tolerated the misconduct, or knew of the history of deviance. 
Although this is a simplified example, it would not be inappropriate 
for a jury to reasonably infer, considering these failures within the 
ranks of senior management, taken in light of management’s general 
responsibility to be informed of and control the conduct of 
                                                                                                                 
269 See supra notes 30–33 and accompanying text (supporting the Model Penal Code’s use 
of the high managerial agent standard) and Part III.A (describing the tight relationship between 
top management and corporate deviance). For example, it may, in many circumstances, be 
appropriate to convict a corporation where the Chief Executive Officer, or a similarly senior 
officer, alone engages in the misconduct with the required mental state because that individual is 
so closely connected with the organization, and is so representative of “senior management” that 
his actions and intentions are appropriately attributed to the organization.  
270 See supra Part III.A for a discussion of the justifications for this ability to narrow the 
focus to the group of senior management most closely connected to the deviance. 
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subordinates, that senior management acted with knowledge through, 
among other potential factors, its toleration, lack of oversight, failure 
to implement proper controls, and express or implied pressures on 
subordinates.  
The core utility of the SMMR approach over Laufer’s model stems 
from judges’ and juries’ abilities to think about the corporate “mental 
state” of a body of individuals who are capable of forming mental 
processes, rather than of a corporation. To presume that the courts, 
and more questionably, jurors, will truly be able to accept and analyze 
the corporation, an intangible, abstract entity, as an independently 
thinking “person” amenable to the application of a mental state, is 
simply too far of a logical leap. Even if courts can overcome this 
cognitive barrier, to also assume that the factfinder can wade through 
the expanse of culpability evidence, considering the differences in 
size, complexity, and functionality of organizations, to come up with 
consistent determinations as to whether intangible entities acted 
purposefully, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently is an even further 
stretch. At the end of the day, it is easier to think about the thought 
processes of a group of individuals making decisions for the 
organization, and to ascribe a mental state to that group, than it is to 
do the same of the elusive abstraction that is the corporate person. By 
shifting the task to making an SMMR determination, the jury is 
armed with a more familiar perspective against which to approximate 
a mental state, a body of tangible, thinking, decision making 
individuals.  
At the same time, this shift maintains the other substantive and 
implementation advantages of Laufer’s model. It avoids the 
overinclusiveness of vicarious liability271 by considering genuine 
organizational culpability. This culpability is understood by focusing 
on the subjective culpability of senior managers bearing a close 
relationship to the action and intention of the organization, and by the 
use of the accepted factors contributing to organizational culpability 
as circumstantial evidence of senior management’s mens rea. On the 
other hand, it skirts the underinclusiveness272 by avoiding reliance on 
individually culpable agents. Further, SMMR is an improvement over 
the courts’ attempts at aggregating individual pieces of culpability 
under the collective knowledge doctrine,273 which neglects a proper 
consideration of the agent-entity relationship and of the expanse of 
                                                                                                                 
271 See supra Part I.B.6 (discussing the over- and underinclusiveness of the current 
scheme). 
272 See id.. 
273 See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the law’s attempts to incorporate genuine culpability 
through the collective knowledge doctrine). 
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variables contributing to genuine organizational culpability. These 
substantive strengths are achieved in a model capable of integration 
into the standards of graded culpability used in the existing criminal 
law.  
D. SMMR in Action 
Because most of the utility of the standard over Laufer’s 
constructive culpability model stems from its streamlined analysis 
and implementation, the liability results should closely match those 
hypothesized by Laufer.274 The Arthur Andersen obstruction of 
justice case provides a useful set of facts against which to test this 
model. Again, at issue was whether an Andersen agent “‘knowingly, 
intentionally and corruptly persuade[d] . . . [other Andersen 
employees] with intent to cause’ them to withhold documents from, 
and alter documents for use in . . . ‘regulatory and criminal 
proceedings and investigations.’”275   
The conviction generally turned on Andersen’s document retention 
procedures when the Enron accounting scandal came to a head in 
August of 2001. On August 14, a senior Enron accountant gave three 
warnings of the oncoming trouble:  one to Enron CEO Kenneth Lay, 
one to David Duncan, the head partner of Andersen’s Enron 
“engagement team” (the group of personnel responsible for 
Andersen’s auditing and consulting services), and one to Duncan’s 
supervisor and fellow partner, Michael Odom.276 Andersen had ample 
reason from the start to expect an SEC investigation due to its June 
2001 SEC settlement in connection with its audit work for Waste 
Management, Inc., under which it was effectively placed on probation 
with the SEC.277 The Enron scandal publicly surfaced in the Wall 
Street Journal in late August, and the SEC promptly opened an 
informal investigation.278 By early September, Andersen had formed 
an Enron “‘crisis response’” team, which included a number of high-
level partners and Andersen in-house counsel, and on October 8, 
Andersen retained outside counsel to represent it in litigation resulting 
from its involvement with Enron.279 In early October, Odom held a 
                                                                                                                 
274 See supra Part II.C for a summary of the standards and an application of Laufer’s 
constructive culpability. Again, the goal of the suggested modifications is to avoid undue 
complexity and the risk of improper and inconsistent application, which the author contends, 
may create an unnecessarily high probability of unintended liability results. 
275 Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 702 (2005) (citation omitted). 
276 Id. at 698–99. 
277 Brief for the United States at 2–3, Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 
(2005) (No. 04–368) 2005 WL 738080. 
278 Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. at 699. 
279 Id.; see also Brief for the United States at 3, Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 
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training meeting with eighty-nine Andersen employees, including ten 
from the Enron engagement team, and informed all to adhere to the 
firm’s document retention policy, which stated that “[i]n cases of 
threatened litigation, . . . no related information will be destroyed . . . 
[and] separately . . .  that, if [Andersen] is advised of litigation or 
subpoenas regarding a particular engagement, the related information 
should not be destroyed.”280 However, Odom added: “[i]f it’s 
destroyed in the course of [the] normal policy and litigation is filed 
the next day, that’s great . . . . [W]e’ve followed our own policy, and 
whatever there was that might have been of interest to somebody is 
gone and irretrievable.”281  
The high probability of an Enron-related investigation and 
litigation was expressly recognized by Nancy Temple, an Andersen 
in-house counsel working on the crisis response team, in notes taken 
at an October 9 meeting with other in-house counsel.282 On October 
20, after receiving a letter from the SEC to Enron notifying it that it 
had opened an informal investigation in August, Andersen’s counsel 
emphasized in a conference call that the Enron crisis-response team 
follow the retention policy.283 After the call, Duncan met with other 
Andersen partners on the engagement team and advised them to 
ensure that team members were complying with the retention 
policy.284  
Duncan’s advice to stick to the retention policy fanned throughout 
the organization. Partners held smaller meetings with subordinates 
discussing the SEC investigation and confirming the need for 
compliance with the destruction policy to the extent that, as the 
government contended, “[m]embers of the Enron engagement team 
were instructed to make document destruction a priority.”285 
                                                                                                                 
 
U.S. 696 (2005) (No.04–368) 2005 WL 738080. 
280 Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. at 700 n.4 (quotations and citations omitted). 
281 Id. at 700 (quotation and citation omitted). 
282 Her notes acknowledged that “some SEC investigation” was “highly probable,” that 
there was a “reasonable possibility [that the accounting practices at issue] will force a 
restatement” of Enron’s financial statements, and that there was a “probability of charge of 
violating [the injunction] in Waste Management.” Brief for the United States at 3–4, Arthur 
Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005) (No. 04–368) 2005 WL 738080 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
283 Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. at 700–01. 
284 Id. at 701. 
285 Brief for the United States at 7, Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 
(2005) (No. 04–368) 2005 WL 738080 at *7. In fact, one Andersen partner instructed a manager 
that it was so crucial to clean up files because “we may be subpoenaed,” and another employee 
stated in an e-mail to other employees that the order to destroy documents “came from a partner 
group and is considered VERY important.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Similar 
instructions went out to other offices handling Enron matters. Id. at 7–8. 
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Throughout this period, despite the inevitable litigation, Andersen 
continued substantial destruction of electronic and paper documents. 
On one occasion, a fellow Andersen partner warned Duncan of the 
impropriety of continued destruction, and on another, during a 
meeting with a forensics investigator concerning his document 
retention practices, Duncan shredded a document labeled “smoking 
gun” stating “we don’t need this.”286 At trial, the government 
produced an exhibit depicting the time and quantity of documents 
shredded at the Andersen’s main Houston office, showing that 
destruction remained relatively steady throughout the time during 
which the Enron turmoil surfaced, but spiked five-fold on October 
25.287 Finally, on November 9, Duncan’s secretary circulated an email 
stating that Andersen had been served a subpoena for records, and per 
Duncan’s instruction, there was to be no further shredding.288 
Under the senior management model, the required senior 
management action is present. Again, a corporation is presumed to 
have acted through senior management where any agent, or group of 
agents has performed an illegal activity while carrying out a job-
related function except where the corporation is the intended victim 
of the conduct. The actions of the Andersen agents involved were 
clearly not undertaken with personal benefits in mind, but instead, to 
stick to protocol, or more likely, to cover Andersen’s tracks. 
The mens rea analysis under these circumstances reflects the 
pragmatic advantages of the SMMR model over the strict imputation 
standard used at trial and in the subsequent appeals. A conviction 
under the current liability scheme required the government to prove 
that one of the agents involved knowingly and corruptly persuaded 
others to engage in document destruction, which under the Supreme 
Court’s statutory interpretation, required consciousness of the 
wrongdoing.289 Aside from the difficulties presented by this 
interpretive issue, the jury initially battled the dilemma as to its ability 
to convict based on a “patchwork verdict”—that is, a conviction 
reached where the jurors “agree that the accused has done something 
illegal,” but can reach no consensus on a single agent possessing the 
requisite mental state.290 The SMMR model avoids the difficulties 
                                                                                                                 
286 Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. at 701 n.6 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
287 United States v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 374 F.3d 281, 286 (5th Cir. 2004), rev’d, 544 
U.S. 696 (2005). 
288 Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. at 702. 
289 See id. at 705–06 (holding that because the “natural meanings” of the terms 
“knowingly” and “corruptly” are “normally associated with awareness, understanding, or 
consciousness” that “[o]nly persons conscious of wrongdoing can be said to ‘knowingly [and] 
corruptly persuad[e]’”). 
290 Stacey Nuemann Vu, Note, Corporate Criminal Liability: Patchwork Verdicts and the 
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presented by the individualistic constraints of respondeat superior. 
Instead of chasing the subjective culpability of an individual agent, 
the jury would consider Andersen’s culpability from the broader 
perspective of senior management, as a group, using the subjective 
knowledge of those senior managers tied to the misconduct, as well as 
evidence of other organizational variables aggravating and mitigating 
senior management’s culpability.  
The first step in the analysis is to frame the representative senior 
management group. Although the extent of agents involved and the 
precise responsibilities of each individual is not clear from the 
reported facts, it is likely that the presentation of evidence would 
focus heavily on the involvement of Duncan, Odom, and Temple, all 
of whom appear to satisfy the definition of senior management due to 
their high-level, apparently supervisory responsibilities, and who 
were closely involved with document retention procedures. In 
addition, the testimony of other senior partners and sufficiently senior 
agents involved with the Enron matter, up to the highest-ranked 
Enron executives, would be presented in attempts by the prosecution 
and defense to respectively aggravate and mitigate the evidence of 
senior management’s knowledge of the corrupt persuasion. But based 
on the facts at hand, the actions and intent of Duncan, Odom, and 
Temple would be the most prominent in the SMMR determination. 
The case likely presents circumstances worthy of a conclusion that 
senior management acted to knowingly persuade Andersen employees 
to obstruct justice. Because a conviction is possible absent proof of an 
individually culpable agent, the jury would consider the 
organization’s urgency to continue extensive document destruction, 
which was unarguably triggered by senior management’s awareness 
of the imminent investigation. Certainly, a jury would heavily weigh 
the actions of Duncan, Odom, and Temple due to their close nexus to 
the deviance.  The jury could also more broadly consider the actions 
and intentions of senior management as the turmoil escalated to be at 
a level roughly approximating knowledge that an investigation and 
litigation was on the horizon. The jury could further assume that its 
instructions were rooted in corrupt motives given its knowledge that 
Andersen would soon be under investigatory scrutiny. The 
prosecution would likely attempt to aggravate the SMMR by 
presenting management’s involvement in the recent Waste 
Management litigation to prove its knowledge of the importance of 
document retention during the early stages of investigation as a means 
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to demonstrate that management knew it was attempting to cover 
Andersen’s tracks as soon as the scandal surfaced. Finally, the 
prosecution could point to the company’s failure to have adequate 
controls in place to ensure document retention as further aggravating 
evidence. This culpability can be traced all the way up to the most 
senior levels of management, because executives were certainly 
aware of the imminence of the Enron turmoil and at least had to have 
raised an eyebrow at or turned a blind eye to management’s relentless 
document shredding, and thus failed to use their authority to ensure 
proper retention. Accordingly, even assuming the lack of required 
knowledge on the part of any individual agent as determined by the 
Supreme Court, it would be proper for a jury to hold that senior 
management acted knowingly. 
The model is equally applicable and effective on a smaller scale. 
Recall, for example, Life Care Centers,291in which a nursing home 
was prosecuted for involuntary manslaughter arising from a patient’s 
falling death which occurred because an administrative employee 
accidentally removed a physician’s order from the patient’s charts 
which said that the patient was required to wear a security bracelet 
preventing her from leaving the building on her own. The employee 
mistakenly removed the bracelet based on a misinterpretation of the 
nursing home’s director’s instructions to “clean up” the treatment 
charts.292 On the night of the death, the decedent’s unit was short-
staffed, so a replacement nurse, unfamiliar with the decedent’s course 
of treatment, did not check for the bracelet because of the absence of 
the order in the patient’s treatment charts and because the 
replacement nurse was not otherwise informed of the omission by the 
patient’s regular nurses.293  
In this instance, as will be typical under this model, corporate 
action is present due to the lack of victimization of the organization. 
Involuntary manslaughter under Massachusetts law would require a 
reckless SMMR as to the patient’s death.294 It is unclear from the 
facts just how far down the ladder the representative senior 
management group would extend in this case, but it is likely that 
those individuals relevant to the analysis will include the nursing 
home director, and potentially any other senior administrators or 
                                                                                                                 
291 Commonwealth v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 926 N.E.2d 206, 208 (Mass. 2010). 
292 Id. at 209. 
293 Id. at 210. 
294 See id. at 212 (“Conviction of involuntary manslaughter requires more than negligence 
or gross negligence . . . . The act causing death must be undertaken in disregard of probable 
harm to others in circumstances where there is a high likelihood that such harm will result.”) 
(citations omitted). 
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nurses exercising policy and procedure making discretion. In this 
case, the prosecution would focus its proof of recklessness on senior 
management’s failure to implement adequate policies and procedures 
relating to the management of patients’ charts, staffing, and 
communication with nurses in a manner demonstrating deliberate 
indifference to a substantial risk of harm to the patient.295 The 
absence of policies and procedures for the management and cleanup 
of medical charts would be a significantly aggravating factor. This 
absence would further raise culpability if there had been instances of 
similar mishaps involving medical charts causing patient 
mistreatment in the past. The prosecution could bolster its argument 
for a reckless SMMR by focusing on the short-staffing if this decision 
can be traced back to senior management, especially if there is a 
history of similar staffing decisions. Finally, because the nursing 
home director was so closely tied to the medical chart misstep, the 
prosecution may rely heavily on his manner of delegation as a source 
of deliberate inattention to a substantial risk of harm due to his 
extremely general instructions given to an individual apparently 
unfamiliar with proper chart management. There is no precise recipe 
for the number and strength of these and other pieces of aggravating 
evidence required to support a conclusion of recklessness on the part 
of senior management. But armed with the definition of recklessness 
and a body of individuals against which to consider the relevant 
actions and omissions, a jury could weigh the substantiality of the risk 
taken to reach a reasoned estimation as to whether senior 
management acted recklessly with respect to the patient’s death. 
CONCLUSION 
The corporate criminal law’s adherence to individualistic standards 
of vicarious liability, imputing the mens rea of individual corporate 
agents, is unjustifiably defective. The current liability scheme’s 
failure to consider the independence of individual and organizational 
culpability has created an unnecessarily large risk of over- and 
underinclusive application of the criminal liability to organizations. 
Distinct, genuine organizational culpability has long been 
acknowledged, but has only been incorporated, albeit inadequately, 
into the criminal law through federal prosecutorial and judicial 
sentencing guidelines. Under the present model, the corporation is 
essentially strictly liable in the eyes of the law, and only able to 
defend itself at the indictment and sentencing stages. At that point 
                                                                                                                 
295 Evidence of this nature was not presented in the Court’s summary of facts, likely due to 
its irrelevance to the analysis, the prosecutions failure to raise it at trial, or its absence entirely. 
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prosecutorial and judicial discretion reign free, permitting the 
government and judges to flexibly consider the organization’s actual 
culpability in the offense using a malleable group of factors, many of 
which focus on the organization’s post-offense conduct. Although 
generally substantively sound, the foremost proposals for 
incorporating genuine organizational culpability into liability 
standards exhibit implementation-related flaws risking unintended 
liability results, compromising their normative merits. Building from 
the substantive wisdom of these proposals, the proposed SMMR 
approach ensures the consideration of genuine organizational 
culpability in a framework that can be seamlessly integrated into the 
graded culpability scheme of our criminal statutes, and, using the 
familiar humanistic perspective of “senior management” courts and 
juries may consistently implement, understand, and apply. 
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